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ARTICLES
GOOD CATHOLICS SHOULD BE
RAWLSIAN LIBERALS
LESLIE GRIFFIN*
John Rawls's Political Liberalism promises to be as important to
law and political theory as was his previous work, A Theory of Justice.
Political Liberalism is also an important book about religion. As part
of his analysis of politics, Rawls examines the role of religion in the
liberal state. While some readers have praised certain aspects of
Rawls's account of religion, he has to date received extensive criticism
of it. A major concern has been that Rawlsian liberalism is too "secu-
lar," too "exclusive," and not sufficiently "inclusive" of religious opin-
ions and commitments.
Rawls's position-and the criticisms of it-are reminiscent of the
complaints made about John Courtney Murray's writings in the 1940s
and 1950s. Murray was the American Jesuit whose arguments justi-
fied American Catholic support of the First Amendment. His articles
on church and state eventually prompted the Roman Catholic Church
to change its official teaching on religious liberty. This occurred, how-
ever, only after years in which, under orders from Rome, Murray
stopped publishing articles about church-state theory because they
contradicted Catholic faith. Murray's writings are now enjoying a ren-
aissance among Catholic scholars who are struggling with the difficult
church-state questions of our era. However, many of them have for-
gotten or abandoned a central insight of Murray, shared by John
Rawls, that political and legal discourse and decision-making should
* Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; Ph.D., Yale (Religious
Studies); J.D., Stanford Law School. My thanks are due to the Harvard Program in Ethics and
the Professions, where I began this Article; to Tom Grey, Robert Krieg, Martha Minow, David
Estlund, and David Skeel for their advice on the manuscript; and first, to Professor John Rawls,
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be conducted according to norms accessible to all citizens, i.e., accord-
ing to "natural law" or "public reason." This "retreat from Murray"
among theologians parallels a trend in the legal academy, where, e.g.,
Stephen Carter and the Catholic Michael Perry (who begins his book
on religion and law with a quotation from Murray) oppose the "trivi-
alization" or "bracketing" of religion. They strive for more inclusion
of religion in law and politics, with implicit and sometimes explicit
criticism of the Rawlsian framework.
In this Article I defend the Rawlsian account of religion's role in
law and politics. In Part I, I examine Rawls's account of religion and
identify the features of Rawlsian religion that appear objectionable to
adherents of religion. Part II examines Murray's thought and notes
the similarities between Rawls's and Murray's attempts to resolve the
problem of pluralism. There are continuities, e.g., between Murray's
"natural law" theory and Rawls's account of "public reason." In addi-
tion, both Murray and Rawls recognize the independence of law and
politics from certain religious arguments. In Part III I analyze what I
have labeled the "retreat from Murray." This section examines the
dissatisfaction among some writers with Murray's public philosophy
framework. Among these critics I focus on Michael Perry, who in
Love and Power claims to follow in the tradition of Murray at the
same time that he rejects Rawls's "neutralist" account of politics. I
argue that Perry's "ecumenical political dialogue," as well as the
"inclusivist" view of religion he adopts post-Love and Power, are inad-
equate accounts of the relationship of religion to law and politics.
Politics and law are better served by the autonomy of law and politics
from religion that Rawls and Murray propose.
I. RAWLS ON RELIGION
A. COMPREHENSIVE DocrRinEs
To some extent, religion is the source of Rawls's project; the "his-
torical origin of political liberalism ... is the Reformation and its
aftermath."' After the Reformation (and in contrast to the ancient
world), deep and irreconcilable differences in religious belief occur.
"Political liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute depth of that
irreconcilable latent conflict."2
1. JoHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv (1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
2. Id. at xxvi.
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Rawls's account of religion emerges in his discussion of compre-
hensive doctrines. In his classic A Theory of Justice, Rawls had argued
that "[a]n essential feature of a well-ordered society associated with
justice as fairness is that all its citizens endorse this conception on the
basis of . . .a comprehensive philosophical doctrine."3 In Political
Liberalism, Rawls states that this account of justice is "unrealistic"4
and encounters a "serious problem."5 "A modem democratic society
is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible
yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines."6 Moreover, "[n]ot all rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines are liberal."7 Political Liberalism's
theory of political justice is no longer based on a comprehensive lib-
eral philosophical doctrine.8
Rawls poses the "philosophical question" of political liberalism
more sharply in the new introduction to the paper edition, and his
question focuses on the subject of religion. "[Confficting comprehen-
sive liberalisms such as those of Kant and Mill" do not pose the funda-
mental philosophical problem.
Thus the question should be more sharply put this way: How is it
possible for those affirming a religious doctrine that is based on reli-
gious authority, for example, the church or the Bible, also to hold a
reasonable political conception that supports a just democratic
regime? The point is that not all reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines are liberal comprehensive doctrines; so the question is
whether they can still be compatible for the right reasons with a
liberal political conception? 9
3. Id. at xvi. In the Introduction to the Paper Edition of POLITICAL LIBERALISM, Rawls
states that A THEORY OF JUSTICE relied on the premise "that in the well-ordered society of
justice as fairness, citizens hold the same comprehensive doctrine, and this includes aspects of
Kant's comprehensive liberalism." JOHN RAWLS, POLrmC.it LIBERALiSM xlii (paper ed. 1996)
[hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED.].
4. POLrTICAL LmERALISM, supra note 1, at xvii.
5. Id. at xvi.
6. Id. at xvi.
7. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at xxxix.
8. See also John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J. Pmn. 109, 132, 135 (1995) ("Of the two
main differences between Habermas's position and mine, the first is that his is comprehensive
while mine is an account of the political and it is limited to that." "Habermas's position, on the
other hand, is a comprehensive doctrine and covers many things far beyond political philosophy.
Indeed, the aim of his theory of communicative action is to give a general account of meaning,
reference, and truth or validity both for theoretical reason and for the several forms of practical
reason. It rejects naturalism and emotivism in moral argument and aims to give a full defense of
both theoretical and practical reason. Moreover, he often criticizes religious and metaphysical
views.").
9. POLmCAL LIERALsM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at xxxix.
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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This "pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive
doctrines" is the starting point of Political Liberalism, the central
problem with which Rawls wrestles. Problem may be the wrong word.
Rawls does not describe this situation of pluralism as "evil," or as a
"disaster," nor does he expect that one reasonable comprehensive
doctrine will ever be affirmed by all citizens. Instead, "[p]olitical lib-
eralism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable
yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions
of a constitutional democratic regime."'1 In a constitutional democ-
racy, many comprehensive doctrines are "reasonable yet incompati-
ble."" From this assumption Rawls develops an account of a
"political conception of justice. ' '11
The "burdens of judgment" help to explain why reasonable disa-
greement among persons remains, i.e., why even reason cannot
resolve these disagreements.' 3 Rawls states that "[i]t is unrealistic-
or worse, it arouses mutual suspicion and hostility-to suppose that all
our differences are rooted solely in ignorance and perversity, or else in
the rivalries for power, status, or economic gain."' 4 Instead, the bur-
dens of judgment account for many of these differences. Those bur-
dens of judgment include: conflicting evidence; disagreement about
the weight of relevant considerations; the indeterminacy of all our
concepts, an indeterminacy that requires judgment and interpretation;
individuals who are shaped by their different experience; ways of
weighing different normative concepts; and limited social space."5
These burdens contribute to the coexistence of "reasonable yet
incompatible" doctrines.
10. Id. at xviii. See also id. at xxvi-xxvii ("[P]olitical liberalism assumes the fact of reason-
able pluralism as a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, including both religious and nonreli-
gious doctrines. This pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the
activities of human reason under enduring free institutions. To see reasonable pluralism as a
disaster is to see the exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself as a disaster."); id.
at 36 ("[D]iversity ... is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a perma-
nent feature of the public culture of democracy. Under the political and social conditions
secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and irrecon-
cilable-and what's more, reasonable-comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist if
such diversity does not already obtain."); id. at 37 ("[T]he fact of reasonable pluralism is not an
unfortunate condition of human life.").
11. Id. at xviii.
12. Id. at 44.
13. POLrrCAI. LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 54.
14. POLrTCAL LiBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at 58.
15. Id. at 56-57.
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Religious views are obviously implicated in Rawls's project, as he
acknowledges that some of the "main existing reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines... are religious.' 1 6 Even at this level, with a brief indi-
cation of Rawls's discussion of comprehensive doctrines, one glimpses
why Rawls's proposal may be questioned by some religious believers.
For example, a person who believes in the truth of her religion may
not accept this pluralism of comprehensive doctrines. Believers who
insist on the truth of their comprehensive doctrine may find Rawls
unsatisfyingly agnostic on the subject of religious truth. Some reli-
gious believers, of course, agree with Rawls that there is a pluralism of
comprehensive doctrines in liberal society. In this account, Rawls's
description of society is not incorrect. However, they resist the next
step of Rawls's argument, that this pluralism is "normal" and will not
disappear. Some believers in the truth of their comprehensive doc-
trines vill prefer to lead others to the truth, to overcome the pluralism
of conflicting views, to fight conflicting comprehensive doctrines in
order to achieve agreement on the truth. Others may attribute the
pluralism to human sin, or to moral or religious failure, and so commit
themselves to changing what Rawls accepts as the inevitable pluralism
of our political life. Ecumenical religious believers may reject that
type of truth, yet still seek an ecumenical comprehensive doctrine to
resolve questions about justice. Rawls himself notes the difference
between political liberalism and the theories of Plato, Aristotle, and
the Christian tradition, which identified one comprehensive doctrine
for all citizens.17
For critics, however, more unsatisfactory than Rawls's acceptance
of pluralism are the implications of that pluralism. In a brief summary
that encapsulates his project, Rawls identifies three features that char-
acterize political liberalism in a constitutional democracy.
[T]hree conditions seem to be sufficient for society to be a fair and
stable system of cooperation between free and equal citizens who
are deeply divided by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines they
affirm. First, the basic structure of society is regulated by a political
conception ofjustice; second, this political conception is the focus of
an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines;
and third, public discussion, when constitutional essentials and
16. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at xviii.
17. Id. at 134 (Rawls characterizes the Christian view as one of "[s]uch views [that] hold
that institutions are justifiable to the extent that they effectively promote that good.").
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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questions of basic justice are at stake, is conducted in terms of the
political conception of justice.18
These three central features of political liberalism-the political con-
ception of justice, the overlapping consensus, and public discussion
("public reason")-are also the most important elements for readers
who are interested in religion. Indeed, all three features have been
criticized by authors who conclude that Rawls's account of political
liberalism is inadequate in its treatment of religion, inadequate in
large part because it excludes too much religion from liberal society.
B. THE POLITICAL CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE
Rawls's first condition for democratic society, then, is a political
conception of justice that is not in itself a comprehensive doctrine. If
pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is an abiding feature of our
political landscape, then citizens must find a way to live within this
pluralism. The pluralism will abide; we will not find a comprehensive
doctrine of justice that all citizens can support. Such unity of doctrine
among citizens will occur only if the state enforces it. "[A] continuing
shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical,
or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of
state power." 9 As from the Middle Ages the Inquisition emerged to
enforce unanimity, so coercion is necessary to maintain any society
joined by a common comprehensive doctrine, whether philosophical
or religious.20 Rawls labels this need for force to enforce a common
doctrine "'the fact of oppression."''
In a constitutional regime, then, there are two general facts of
public culture: "the fact of reasonable pluralism and the fact that this
diversity can be overcome only by the oppressive use of state
power."'  But in a constitutional democracy, it is not appropriate to
18. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 37.
20. Rawls states:
If we think of political society as a community united in affirming one and the same
comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is necessary for polit-
ical community. In the society of the Middle Ages, more or less united in affirming the
Catholic faith, the Inquisition was not an accident; its suppression of heresy was needed
to preserve that shared religious belief. The same holds, I believe, for any reasonable
comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrine, whether religious or nonreligious. A
society united on a reasonable form of utilitarianism, or on the reasonable liberalisms
of Kant or Mill, would likewise require the sanctions of state power to remain so.
Id.
21. Id. (citing Sanford Shieh).
22. Id. at 54.
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use force in order to impose one's comprehensive world view on
others who do not share that commitment. "[N]o comprehensive doc-
trine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional
regime. ' Constitutional regimes should not impose comprehensive
world views by force.
And so a political conception of justice must be found that does
not impose a comprehensive world view on others, and that is itself
not comprehensive. Political justice is instead an independent "mod-
ule" that can be plugged into numerous reasonable but competing
comprehensive doctrines. This political conception of justice
encounters some of the same challenges as Rawls's acceptance of a
pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, namely that it ignores the truth
(or falsity) of certain world views. The module (the "freestanding
view") is problematic to comprehensive doctrines that require a true
conception of justice. Rawls insists that political liberalism is primar-
ily concerned with the reasonable, not the true.
[The] idea of the reasonable is more suitable as part of the basis of
public justification for a constitutional regime than the idea of
moral truth. Holding a political conception as true, and for that rea-
son alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exclusive, even
sectarian, and so likely to foster political division.24
Religious believers may insist that the true should trump the reason-
able in politics and so strive to build a political order based on truth.
23. Id. at 135.
24. Id. at 129. But see Paul F. Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 1814,
1816, 1820 (1994) ("Rawls's analysis of political issues amounts to little more than the shamanis-
tic incantation of the word 'reasonable."'; "It seems that, for Rawls, 'reason' and 'reasonable' fill
the lexical space that in many other discourses would be filled by 'God,' or 'the scriptures,' or
'moral insight."'); Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEO. WAsH. L. Rnv. 646, 650
(1994) (book review) ("By excluding sectarian views of the good from politics without acknowl-
edging the ensuing legitimacy problem, Raws denies, albeit implicitly, that such sectarian views
might be true; this denial is consistent with comprehensive, not political, liberalism."); Daniel J.
Gifford, Interpersonal Distrust in the Modified Rawlsian Society, 48 SMU L. REv. 217,218 (1994)
("Rawls has unnecessarily confused his new framework and alienated many of his potential sup-
porters by imbuing the definition of reasonableness with his own political preferences."); Joshua
Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MscH. L. REv. 1503, 1537 (1994) (book review)
(expressing general concern about the exclusionary definition of reasonable; "If, however,, rea-
sonable is defined independently from acceptance of the political conception-say, in terms of a
willingness to entertain and respond to objections-then reasonable citizens will likely affirm
reasonable views that reject the political conception."); Jean Hampton, The Common Faith of
Liberalism, 75 PAC. PIL Q. 186,210 (1994) ("However, there is no place in Rawls's book where
the notion of the reasonable is given clear and precise definition. Such a vaguely defined notion
will therefore be filled out by one's intuitions, and of course, intuitions can vary. When Rawls
uses his intuitions to fill out the word, and then classifies some views as unreasonable, he will
come into conflict with those whose intuitions on such matters are substantially different.").
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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But Rawls opposes the imposition of "true" comprehensive doctrines
in a constitutional democracy: "it is vital to the idea of political liber-
alism that we may with perfect consistency hold that it would be
unreasonable to use political power to enforce our own comprehen-
sive view, which we must, of course, affirm as either reasonable or
true." Such consistency may be difficult for religious believers who
do not find it unreasonable to enforce the truth.
The political conception of justice offers an additional problem
for those who hold a religious world view as a comprehensive doc-
trine: Rawls does not derive or deduce the political conception of jus-
tice from any comprehensive world view.26 This module may be
troubling to philosophers as well as theologians who expect a concep-
tion of justice to be comprehensive or who insist that such justice must
be derived from comprehensive world views.27 Critics have suggested
that Rawlsian political justice is in fact derived from the comprehen-
sive doctrine of Kantianism. This may well be true, but this criticism
need not change Rawls's theory. Rawls acknowledges that the polit-
ical conception of justice may be derived from a number of competing
comprehensive doctrines. The derivation does not matter as long as
the political conception of justice is reasonable.28 It is the derivation
25. But see Greene, supra note 24, at 669 ("An actual political liberal [in contrast to a
comprehensive liberal] would, after arguing for a rule excluding certain arguments from politics,
be concerned with the theoretical possibility that he has just silenced the truth."); Peter F. Lake,
Liberalism Within the Limits of the Reasonable Alone: Developments of John Rawls' Political
Philosophy, Its Political Positivism, and the Limits on Its Applicability, 19 VT. L. Rav. 603, 608-09
(1995) ("I believe that much of Rawls' tendency to limitation and abstraction comes from his
fear of the unreasonable and a skepticism about the possibility of the discovery of truth and the
attainment of excellence in human form. Political liberalism, at least as Rawls conceives of it,
fights the belief that we exist in a comprehensive, ordered universe and has adopted as its raison
d'etre the defense of the illusion of a place of safety (the domain of the political) as its alternative
to the acceptance of truth.").
26. Although some citizens may in fact so derive it, see infra note 70. For the criticism that
Rawls's theory is inadequate because "a person's perception of the relationship between polit-
ical principles and his comprehensive view is itself a part of that person's comprehensive view,"
see generally Miriam Galston, Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Political Thought, 94
COLUM. L. Rav. 1842, 1844 (1994).
27. Rawls himself addresses this criticism of the overlapping consensus in POLMCAL Lm-
ERALiSM, supra note 1, at 154-58. See also Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibil-
ity of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69 Cm.-KENT L. Rav. 619, 657 (1994) (analyzing the claim
that "religious persons, or for that matter anyone who affirms a metaphysical or ethical doctrine,
can only conduct their political deliberations by appealing to their comprehensive views").
28. See also Rawls, supra note 8, at 136 ("For in presenting a freestanding political concep-
tion and not going beyond that, it is left entirely open to citizens and associations in civil society
to formulate their own ways of going beyond, or of going deeper, so as to make that political
conception congruent with their comprehensive doctrines. Political liberalism never denies or
questions these doctrines in any way, so long as they are politically reasonable.").
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of the political conception of justice from the comprehensive doctrines
of citizens that cccurs in the overlapping consensus.
C. OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
In the midst of disagreement, citizens require stability in their
political lives, and so need a political conception of justice. In the
presence of reasonable pluralism, the political conception of justice
will be based on an overlapping consensus2 9 among the citizens of the
democracy. The consensus is overlapping because citizens can agree
on the political conception even though they possess a variety of com-
prehensive doctrines. The overlapping consensus allows citizens to
live together in a constitutional democracy. The overlapping consen-
sus recalls the module;30 it is one piece of citizens' comprehensive
doctrines.
Rawls himself recognizes that this account of political life is con-
troversial, and so identifies four objections to the overlapping consen-
sus. Critics will argue that it is really a modus vivendi; that the
concept implies indifference or skepticism about the truth; that a
workable political conception must be comprehensive; and that it is
utopian, either because it cannot be brought about or because it will
not be stable if it exists.31 Rawls rebuts all four criticisms. I focus on
the first two charges because they are important to religious critics of
political liberalism.
Rawls insists that the overlapping consensus is not a modus
vivendi,32 in part because "the object of consensus, the political con-
ception of justice, is itself a moral conception. And second, the over-
lapping consensus is affirmed on moral grounds. ' 33 Stability-for the
right reasons-turns out to be the important third element of the
overlapping consensus that distinguishes it from the modus vivendi.
Citizens in a modus vivendi compromise because they must. How-
ever, should circumstances change, they will renegotiate their settle-
ment, usually in an attempt to improve their situation. If they acquire
more power after the negotiation of the modus vivendi, they will push
29. POLTCAL LmERALISM, supra note 1, at 126; see generally id. at 133-72.
30. Id. at 144.
31. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and the Overlapping Consensus, 94 COLUM L.
REv. 1918 (1994) (discussing argument that it is too difficult to get to a real overlapping consen-
sus because of the disparity in comprehensive views).
32. POLITICAL LBERALISM, supra note 1, at 147.
33. Id.
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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to improve their situation. Thus life in a modus vivendi may not be
stable as power shifts and will never be stable for the right reasons.
Citizens in an overlapping consensus, however, value stability for
the right reasons.
This means that those who affirm the various views supporting the
political conception will not withdraw their support of it should the
relative strength of their view in society increase and eventually
become dominant .... [T]he political conception will still be sup-
ported regardless of shifts in the distribution of political power.
Each view supports the political conception for its own sake, or on
its own merits.34
The overlapping consensus is a "moral conception" that is "affirmed
on moral grounds"'35 and is of a different order from the modus
vivendi. Thus citizens do not seek to change it when they gain more
power.
Rawls employs a religious example to distinguish the overlapping
consensus from the modus vivendi. For Catholics and Protestants in
the sixteenth century, religious toleration was a modus vivendi
because each group wanted to establish the true religion. If their
power changed, then the modus vivendi would evaporate. But polit-
ical justice in an overlapping consensus does not fluctuate with power.
Political concepts should not be altered because one comprehensive
doctrine gains more members. Once again, such a notion is controver-
sial for those whose comprehensive doctrines mandate modifications
in politics as power changes hands, or as the "truth" gains supporters.
Consensus may be difficult for some comprehensive doctrines. It may
also be difficult for some religious believers to prefer stability to truth.
Rawls's second criticism of the overlapping consensus echoes the
truth criticisms noted above, with the specific concern that religious
adherents are asked to follow the overlapping consensus "even when
it is known not to be true. '36 Once again, truth is not Rawls's first
34. Id. at 148. "The test for this is whether the consensus is stable with respect to changes
in the distribution of power among views. This feature of stability highlights a basic contrast
between an overlapping consensus and a modus vivendi, the stability of which does depend on
happenstance and a balance of relative forces." Id. at 48. But see Mitchell, supra note 31, at
1929 (Rawls's theory is "inadequate to sustain the trust necessary to bind the overlapping con-
sensus," because people will interpret fundamental principles differently because of their com-
prehensive doctrines.).
35. Por.rricAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 147.
36. Id. at 150.
HeinOnline  -- 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 306 1996-1997
[Vol. 5:297 1997] RAWLSIAN LIBERALS
concern;37 the reasonable makes overlapping consensus possible in a
way that truth does not.38 In another religious example, Rawls does
not state "that the doctrine extra ecclesiam nulla salus is not true."
39
Rather, he contends that citizens are unreasonable when they try to
enforce such a view upon others.'
Rawls's primary response to these two criticisms, modus vivendi
and truth, is that citizens have reasons within their own comprehen-
sive doctrines to support the overlapping consensus. Individuals work
from their comprehensive doctrines to some agreement about the
public basis for liberalism. Thus the overlapping consensus is more
than a compromise: "in the overlapping consensus consisting in the
views just described, the acceptance of the political conception is not a
compromise between those holding different views, but rests on the
totality of reasons specified within the comprehensive doctrine
affirmed by each citizen. ' 41 The overlapping consensus is not an aver-
age of comprehensive doctrines. Rawls does not, of course, explain
37. But see Greene, supra note 24, at 646 (Rawls presupposes the truth of his view and so is
a comprehensive, not a political, liberal.).
38. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 94.
39. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at 138.
40. IL See also id. at 61:
Since many doctrines are seen to be reasonable, those who insist, when fundamental
political questions are at stake, on what they take as true but others do not, seem to
others simply to insist on their own beliefs when they have the political power to do so.
Of course, those who do insist on their beliefs also insist that their beliefs alone are
true: they impose their beliefs because, they say, their beliefs are true and not because
they are their beliefs. But this is a claim that all equally could make; it is also a claim
that cannot be made good by anyone to citizens generally. So, when we make such
claims others, who are themselves reasonable, must count us unreasonable. And
indeed we are, as we want to use state power, the collective power of equal citizens, to
prevent the rest from affirming their not unreasonable views.
But see Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARv. L. Rlv. 1765, 1776 (1994) (book
review) ("Where grave moral questions are concerned, whether it is reasonable to bracket moral
and religious controversies for the sake of political agreement partly depends on which of the
contending moral or religious doctrines is true.").
41. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 170-71. But see Galston, supra note 26, at 1851
("Thus, Rawls excludes from his democratic society any comprehensive view that sees political
theory as part of and inseparable from a comprehensive view. Rawls's political liberalism, in
other words, is based upon a comprehensive view that posits the autonomy of political theory.");
Timothy P. Jackson, To Bedlam and Part Way Back: John Rawls and Christian Justice, 8.1 FArrH
AND PHIL 423, 423-47 (1991) (Christians must affirm the priority of Christian love over Rawisian
justice) [hereinafter Jackson, To Bedlam]; Tnothy P. Jackson, Love in a Liberal Society: A
Response to Paul J. Weithman, 22.1 J. RELIGOoS ETHICs 29, 30 (1994) (arguing that Christians
cannot accept a Rawlsian account of justice based on their comprehensive world view. Chris-
tians are troubled by this view of justice because "the logic of this argument still sacrifices indi-
vidual integrity for corporate benefit.") [hereinafter Jackson, Love in a Liberal Society]; Greene,
supra note 24, at 649 ("Rawls and Dworkin find such coercion justified through a common-
ground view of politics, but that view brushes aside the coercion of citizens whose foundational
views won't allow the cleansing of politics in this way.").
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how every individual comprehensive doctrine comes to accept the
overlapping consensus. He does examine Kant's moral philosophy,
the utilitarianism of Bentham and Sidgwick, and "a pluralist account
of the realms of values" 42 to illustrate how different comprehensive
views could support the political conception ("deductively," as the
"best workable approximation," and by "balancing competing values,
all things tallied up").43 He does not tell all comprehensive doctrines
how to accept the overlapping consensus.
But he does insist that they should do so. Recall that citizens
accept the overlapping consensus because in Rawls's view it is unrea-
sonable for them to coerce others on the basis of their comprehensive
views. But this consensus poses a difficult challenge to religious
believers. Once again, truth claims emerge as a problem for the
believer. The modus vivendi may be easier for the believer to accept.
At times one is forced by society to compromise in the name of sur-
vival, or because one does not have the votes. Political stability-even
political stability for Rawlsian right reasons-appears to offer an
insufficient reason to abandon the truth. If one's religious beliefs are
true, how can she agree to participate in a consensus that is not true,
but only reasonable? Does the citizen not act immorally when she
subordinates the higher value of truth to the lower value of stability-
no matter how reasonable the stability? "[H]ow can we affirm our
comprehensive doctrine and yet hold that it would not be reasonable
to use state power to gain everyone's allegiance to it?" 44 Must not
believers always view their role in political liberalism as a modus
vivendi until the truth emerges or until they have the votes to enforce
the truth?
For political liberalism, the answer is no, for two reasons. Rawls
insists that political values (especially of stability) are great and not
easily overridden, even by comprehensive doctrines. The virtues of
political cooperation are "very great virtues,"'45 and so the comprehen-
sive values that conflict with the political conception of justice are nor-
mally outweighed within the overlapping consensus.46 It is unclear if
42. PoLricAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 170.
43. Id. at 169-71.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. But see Stuart Hampshire, Liberalism: The New Twist, TiH N.Y. REv. oF BooKs, Aug.
12, 1993, at 43, 44 ("At one point Rawls asserts, to me alarmingly, that 'under reasonably
favorable conditions that make democracy possible, political values normally outweigh whatever
nonpolitical values conffict with them.' This meta-statement surely conveys a very substantial
and definite moral point of view, putting the duties owed to basic institutions that are just ones
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believers will accept the primacy of these "very great virtues" over
other virtues such as faith, hope, and charity.47 However, Rawls does
not state that individuals must always prefer stability to other virtues.
This point is made more forcefully in the new introduction to Political
Liberalism, where Rawls insists that this valuable stability is not any
stability, but stability for the right reasons. Moreover, individuals
determine the balance between stability and other values.
Thus, it is left to each citizen, individually or in association with
others, to say how the claims of political justice are to be ordered, or
weighed, against nonpolitical values. The political conception gives
no guidance in such questions, since it does not say how nonpolitical
values are to be counted. This guidance belongs to citizens' com-
prehensive doctrines.48
In the overlapping consensus, "we hope that citizens will judge (by
their comprehensive view) that political values are normally (though
not always) ordered prior to, or outweigh, whatever nonpolitical val-
ues may conflict with them. 4
9
The second reason is the point we have already seen, that the
"plurality of not unreasonable comprehensive doctrines" does not let
one impose her comprehensive views on others.5
To conclude: reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgment
set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others, and so they
endorse some form of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.
It is unreasonable for us to use political power, should we possess it,
ahead of all other human commitments. This ruling brings political liberalism, supposedly not
itself a comprehensive morality, into direct conflict with many comprehensive moralities that are
likely to flourish in a modem democracy."); Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 589, 591 (1994) ("sid[ing] with Rawls against Hampshire").
47. See generally Jackson, To Bedlam, supra note 41; Jackson, Love in a Liberal Society,
supra note 41.
48. Rawls, supra note 8, at 143.
49. Id. at 147.
50. See POLITICAL LmERALISM, supra note 1, at 60-61. ("Beyond this, reasonable persons
will think it unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to repress comprehensive
views that are not unreasonable, though different from their own. This is because, given the fact
of reasonable pluralism, a public and shared basis of justification that applies to comprehensive
doctrines is lacking in the public culture of a democratic society. But such a basis is needed to
mark the difference, in ways acceptable to a reasonable public, between comprehensive beliefs
as such and true comprehensive beliefs."); Cohen, supra note 24, at 1539 (defending the notion
of reasonableness in the overlapping consensus: "To permit those [unreasonable] views to shape
the content of a conception of justice is to permit the content of justice to be determined by the
power of those views to make themselves heard. But no attractive conception can be built
around such an accommodation to power.").
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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or share it with others, to repress comprehensive views that are not
unreasonable. 51
This limitation means that decisions in the overlapping consensus are
made only on the basis of reasons that appeal to all citizens. 2 As part
of their "duty of civility,"'53 citizens in the overlapping consensus must
employ "public reason." Public reason has been the most controver-
sial aspect of Rawls's theory for advocates of religion. 4
D. PUBLIC REASON
These two grounds (i.e., the great political values and the congru-
ence of many comprehensive doctrines with the political conception of
justice) "secure the basis of public reason, for they imply that funda-
mental political questions can be settled by the appeal to political val-
ues expressed by the political conception endorsed by the overlapping
consensus."55 Societies and individuals use many kinds of reason to
formulate and execute their plans. For Rawls, public reason is a spe-
cific type of reason, employed by equal citizens in a democracy.
Public reason, then, is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens
as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the
public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and con-
tent is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by
society's conception of political justice, and conducted open to view
on that basis.56
Public reason is quite demanding, especially for adherents of
comprehensive doctrines. It "means that in discussing constitutional
51. POLITICAL LBE-RALISM, supra note 1, at 61.
52. 1d. at 137. See also id. at 217: ("[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
them as reasonable and rational.").
53. Id. at 253.
54. For critical treatment of this concept, see generally Kent Greenawalt, On Public Rea-
son, 69 CHi.-KErNT L. REv. 669 (1994) [hereinafter Greenawalt, On Public Reason]; Lawrence B.
Solum, Constructing An Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 729 (1994) [hereinafter
Solum, Constructing]; Peter de Marneffe, Rawls's Idea of Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 232
(1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Inclusive Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL Q. 217 (1994); Kent Greena-
walt, Some Problems With Public Reason in John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1303 (1995) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Some Problems]; Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The
Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1936 (1994).
55. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 169.
56. Id. at 213.
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essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to compre-
hensive religious and philosophical doctrines-to what we as individu-
als or members of associations see as the whole truth .... -157 Instead,
public reasoning should rest on more "widely accepted, or available"'58
arguments. "[E]ach of us must have, and be ready to explain, a crite-
rion of what principles and guidelines we think other citizens (who are
also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with
us.")59 Rawls emphasizes this "criterion of reciprocity" in the new edi-
tion of Political Liberalism.6
To its critics, public reason is too restrictive; it excludes religion
from public life.6 1 Society's discourse is impoverished by the banning
of religious language. Biblical narratives, religious imagery, or theo-
logical claims nourish moral insight, and so should be a central part of
public discourse. The historical insight of religious communities may
be neglected. 62 Religious voices are "privatized" by the requirements
57. Id. at 224-25.
58. Id. at 225-26 ("The point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct
their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political concep-
tion of justice based on values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse and each is,
in good faith, prepared to defend that conception so understood. This means that each of us
must have, and be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other
citizens (who are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us.").
59. Id. (emphasis added). See also POLrnICAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at I
("This ideal is that citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely regards as a
reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others
as free and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably [sic] to endorse.").
60. POLrICAL LMERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at -li.
61. For the point that public reason is restrictive, see generally Galston, supra note 26, at
1844 (noting "how exclusionary his political theory in fact is in its characterization of certain
comprehensive views [both religious and non-religious] as unreasonable"); Sandel, supra note
40, at 1776 ("[Public reason] is an unduly severe restriction that would impoverish political dis-
course and rule out important dimensions of public deliberation."); Id. at 1790 ("restrictive char-
acter of liberal public reason"); Wolgast, supra note 54, at 1943 (In the context of the passage of
a law on inoculation for children opposed by a Christian Science congressman, Rawls's approach
deprives individuals of the "considerable power" and "passion" of religious argument. "Framed
in this cooler, more legalistic way, some of its power has certainly been lost."); Cohen, supra
note 24, at 1540-41 ("The account of public reason may seem, then, to undervalue the impor-
tance of forms of critical discourse that do not respect the distinction between moral and political
argument and as a result to truncate politics and practical reason." Consensus should "emerge [
from unconstrained discussion," and public discussion may be too limited. Public reason "per-
haps excludes constructive possibilities of consensus and community that might emerge from
challenging received moral traditions.").
62. See generally John Langan, Overcoming the Divisiveness of Religion: A Response to
Paul J. Weithman, 22 J. RELIGIOUS ETmIcs 47 (1994).
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of public reason when our culture needs the public voice of religion.63
Moreover, public reason discriminates against religion; it allows secu-
lar voices to dominate political discussion.' 4 Once again, its criteria
may exclude the truth. Religious adherents thus become unequal par-
ticipants in their society, their critical perspectives silenced, their theo-
ries of justice suppressed, their moral claims ignored.
However, many of these complaints are contradicted by Rawls's
careful construction of the ideal of public reason. For example, public
reason is required for constitutional essentials and basic justice, not
for all political questions.65 Public reason must occur in the "public
63. See David Hollenbach, Religion and Political Life, 52 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 87, 94, 95
(1991) (voicing criticism of earlier articles by Rawis on the Overlapping Consensus, stating that
religious conceptions of the human good are privatized by Rawls and that Catholics cannot
agree with "his privatized definition of the role of faith"); David Hollenbach, Contexts of the
Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 877, 893 (1993)
(insisting on the importance of public conversation in culture. "To the extent that moral and
political theories seek to exclude the task of education and inquiry from the public forum by
privatizing all full visions of the human good, they undermine the very foundations of public
life.") [hereinafter Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political]; David Hollenbach, Public Reason/Pri-
vate Religion: A Response to Paul J. Weithman, 22.1 J. RELiGIOUS ETHics 39 (1994). But see
Paul J. Weithman, Rawisian Liberalism and the Privatization of Religion: Three Theological
Objections Considered, 22.1 J. RELmIOuS ETHics 3 (1994) (defending Rawls against theological
criticisms).
64. See generally Gary C. Leedes, Rawls' Excessively Secular Political Conception, 27 U.
RicH. L. REv. 1083, 1104 (1993) (book review) ("This kind of discriminatory treatment is
unlikely to end the culture wars between many Americans and their adversaries including Chris-
tian fundamentalists, Islamic fundamentalists, conservative Catholics, and Orthodox Jews.
Rawls is in cloud-cuckoo land if he thinks that religious disagreements will be reduced in number
by a political theory that stigmatizes devout persons whose political opinions are consistently
aligned with their religious orientation."); Campos, supra note 24, at 1825 ("Despite its highly
abstract endorsement of moral and religious pluralism, Political Liberalism is ultimately a paean
to a secular creed that has within it the potential to become every bit as monistic, compulsory,
and intolerant of any significant deviation from social verities as the traditional modes of belief it
derided and displaced."); Greenawalt, On Public Reason, supra note 54, at 688 ("Liberal non-
religious comprehensive perspectives are bound to 'suffer less' from a principle of self-restraint
than both religious views and nonreligious, nonliberal views. This difference may reasonably be
thought to involve a kind of inequity.").
65. These essentials include fundamental principles on the structures of government, and
the equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship. In Political Liberalism, Rawls writes that
"Constitutional essentials concern questions about what political rights and liberties, say, may
reasonably be included in a written constitution, when assuming the constitution may be inter-
preted by a supreme court, or some similar body. Matters of basic justice relate to the basic
structure of society and so would concern questions of basic economic and social justice and
other things not covered by a constitution." POLITCAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at
I n.23. But see Greenawalt, On Public Reason, supra note 54, at 687, 689 (criticizing this distinc-
tion: "Rawls, I believe, has not yet faced the extent to which interpretation of constitutional
essentials infects ordinary political argument."); Greenawalt, Some Problems, supra note 54, at
1305-07 ("For people to recognize this categorization among issues and to act differently in
respect to the two categories requires considerable political sophistication and discipline."); id. at
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political forum," which includes judicial decisions, government offi-
cials' discourse, and the discourse of "all citizens... who take part in
political campaigns in whatever capacity, and especially to their ora-
tory, party platforms and statements. '6 6 Many political discussions
fall outside this sphere. Moreover, Rawls encourages open discussion
of comprehensive doctrines in many of society's "nonpublic" organi-
zations, e.g., universities, churches, and associations. Labeling these
associations "nonpublic" is somewhat confusing, but Rawlsian public
reason allows a multitude of social conversations about comprehen-
sive doctrines. Doctrinal discussions are not stifled.67
Furthermore, if discrimination occurs in Rawls's theory, it is not
discrimination against religious views. While some accounts of consti-
tutional democracy may privilege philosophical beliefs over religious
ones,68 Rawls's "discrimination" is philosophical as well as religious.
It applies to utilitarians as well as to Catholics.6 9 Defenders of reli-
gion should be grateful that Rawls restores religion to an equal foot-
ing with philosophy in its status as a comprehensive doctrine. Critics
1306 (employing examples of abortion and fetal research to illustrate difficulty of this
distinction).
66. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason: Further Considerations 7 (1994) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author). See Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political, supra note 63, at
900 (allowing different standard for politics and the judiciary). But see Greenawalt, Some
Problems, supra note 54, at 1317 ("The result is that ordinary citizens should regard themselves
as much less constrained and legislators somewhat less constrained than Rawls asserts with
respect to constitutional essentials; but legislators and quasi-public citizens should consider
themselves more constrained than Rawls suggests for ordinary issues.").
67. But see Greenawalt, On Public Reason, supra note 54, at 679 ("Rawls's limiting of the
requirement of public reasons to voting and public advocacy is less significant than one might
initially suppose; that requirement would infect thought and discussion of relevant issues in all
settings.").
68. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DoMInIoN: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993); Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of
Life: A Discussion of Life's Dominion, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 160, 172-75 (1995) (book review)
(analyzing Dworkin's "distinction between religion and philosophy").
69. If some philosophical doctrines gain more adherents or are more common than others,
this is not the fault of Rawls's theory. This point is reiterated in Further Considerations: "[A]ll
reasonable comprehensive doctrines are treated in the same way, whether religious, philosophi-
cal, or moral. Religion is no more disfavored, or favored, than metaphysics and moral philoso-
phy. A doctrine of natural, or higher, law is on a par with biblical theology." Rawls, supra note
66, at 1. In Further Considerations, in the context of the judicial nominee, the nominee says:
"What I have said should be said by anyone, whether their comprehensive doctrine is religious
or not. A candidate whose philosophical doctrine is Kantian, say, or else founded on a concep-
tion of natural law and the natural rights of persons, should answer as I have." Id.at 4. But see
Greene, supra note 24, at 659 (questioning Rawls's exclusion of all comprehensive views and
distinguishing religious from non-religious views; "Only religious reference, however, relies on a
source of normative authority that is claimed by its proponents to be beyond the scope of human
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may be correct that Rawls himself favors Kantianism over other com-
prehensive doctrines.70 Yet in doing so he does not discriminate
against religion. The political conception of justice can be derived
from Kantianism as well as from other religious and philosophical
comprehensive doctrines. In this essay I argue that it is consistent
with Roman Catholicism. Although he does not demonstrate this der-
ivation in Political Liberalism, as a citizen Rawls may consistently
derive the political conception of justice from Kantianism while he
invites others to derive justice from their different, equal, philosophi-
cal, and religious comprehensive doctrines.
More difficult for political liberalism than the general charges of
exclusion of and discrimination against religion are criticisms of the
"bracketing" category. At this point it is worth remembering how
demanding public reason is for individuals. Rawls identifies the
Supreme Court as the exemplar of public reason. Public reason
applies to legislatures and the judiciary, to politicians, and to judges.71
Citizens should employ it in public political advocacy. In addition,
citizens should vote on constitutional essentials and basic justice
according to the standards of public reason, not on the basis of their
fundamental comprehensive convictions.72 This standard for voting
may be the most difficult for readers to understand. Public reason
rules even in the midst of social disagreement. Although it may
appear reasonable to "invoke principles appealing to nonpolitical val-
ues to resolve [disagreement] in a way they find satisfactory, ' 73 citi-
zens should not do so on matters of constitutional essentials and basic
justice. Public reason is not abandoned because of disagreement; "if
experience and to be based in special relationships that the Believers have with that source of
authority and that other citizens might not have.").
70. See E.A. Goemer, Rawls's Apolitical Political Turn, 55 REv. PoL. 713,715 (1993) (book
review):
Rawls's new theory imposes second-class citizenship on most religious believers and on
many of those who hold philosophical doctrines in morals that are not tributary to
Kant... he repeatedly shows how his doctrine, although it does not need a Kantian
background, is congruent with or even derivable from more-or-less comprehensive
views of a Kantian sort. But he does not try to show how other comprehensive doc-
trines may relate to his political principles.
71. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 216.
72. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 656 (noting that public reason is hypocritical if it allows
individuals to "vote their personal preferences and comprehensive views with impunity," and
suggesting that Greenawalt must allow for this).
73. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 240 (citing KENT GREENAWALT, RELIOIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE chs. 6-7 (1988)).
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when stand-offs occur, citizens invoke the grounding reasons of their
comprehensive views, the principle of reciprocity is violated."'74
From these demands arise the accusations of bracketing. Rawls
asks the citizen to vote (and to legislate, and to judge) according to
public reason, and so to "bracket" her comprehensive doctrine.75
Such bracketing raises numerous concerns. It poses problems for
moral psychology, e.g., by dividing the individual's comprehensive
doctrine from her public life.7 6 The individual's religious and political
obligations may conflict. 7 Her integrity may be undermined by the
demand that she publicly support positions that violate deep convic-
tions.78 The requirement to use public reason may produce individu-
als who lack sincerity because they publicly advocate reasonable
positions not based on their personal commitments to comprehensive
doctrines.79 "Thus the paradox: one must somehow separate the val-
ues leading to one's positions from the public argument given for
74. PoLmIcAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at Iv.
75. See generally Sandel, supra note 40, at 1776-82.
76. See Wolgast, supra note 54, at 1939 ("Thus the paradox: one must somehow separate
the values leading to one's positions from the public argument given for them. How, one asks,
can a person's responsibilities as a citizen require this?"); Susan Moller Okin, Political Liber-
alism, 87 Am. PoLt Sci. REv. 1010, 1011 (1993) (book review) ("[S]uch a conceptual 'splitting'
[between political and non-political] of persons surely works to provide the stability that Rawls
aims at only if real human beings can think of themselves this way.").
77. Rawls acknowledges this in Further Considerations: "The political conception gives us
no guidance in such questions of conflict, since it doesn't say how nonpolitical values, religious or
philosophical, should be taken into account." Rawls, Further Considerations, supra note 66, at
23A.
78. See Wolgast, supra note 54, at 1941 ("the requirement of civility is problematic in
encouraging the absence of personal integrity in debate."); id at 1943 ("The representative who
recasts his objections to conform to public reason not only argues with less than maximum force,
but also speaks disingenuously. One's reasons for holding a position are integral to the position
itself. They are not chosen after the position is arrived at, except disingenuously."); Jackson,
Love in a Liberal Society, supra note 41 (addressing Christian loss of integrity if one gives prior-
ity to justice over charity).
79. Greenawalt, On Public Reason, supra note 54, at 677-79, discusses these tensions in his
analysis of "public justification" and "decision." Greenawalt states that Political Liberalism sug-
gests that public reason is concerned with public justification and not with decision-making.
However, in the examples of judging and voting, Greenawalt thinks that Rawls makes it clear
that "public reasons should guide decision as well as debate and opinion writing." Id. at 677.
"Rawls's discussion leaves a bit of uncertainty on one subject that is critical to the relation
between actual grounds of decision and public justification-whether the proponent of a position
must himself believe in the public justification he offers." Id at 678. For example, is the legisla-
tor allowed to "vote with an argument of public reasons in which she does not fully believe?" Id.
Greenawalt concludes that Rawls does require a sincere appeal to public reason. See also
Leedes, supra note 64, at 1114-15 (Politically astute leaders who follow Rawls's standard will
conceal their actual goals and become "stealth candidates," who will impose their hidden views
once elected. "Surely, a candid public airing of a religious person's dogmatic worldview is pref-
erable to stealth or terrorism."). For the argument that the Rawlsian framework encourages
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them. How, one asks, can a person's responsibilities as a citizen
require this?"80
Rawls's rejoinder to these bracketing criticisms in the context of a
Supreme Court nomination hearing is illuminating. The nominee is
asked if he can "separate" his religious beliefs from his judicial deci-
sions. Rawls distinguishes between two senses of separation or brack-
eting; the first is impossible and the second is required by public
reason. "Should to separate mean to put aside as irrelevant and not to
rely on in my reasoning, or not to regard these beliefs as among my
first premises, and in that way to bracket my religious beliefs, then I
must answer, No. In that sense separation is impossible."81 However,
justices are required to bracket in the second sense, "not to invoke
certain kinds of reasons in making their decisions, even when those
reasons would be appropriate in other offices and roles."' Public rea-
sons, not the reasons of comprehensive doctrines, are obligatory in
judicial opinions (as well as in legislation and voting).
Rawls resists the criticism of bracketing in the first sense. He
does not ask citizens "to pluck out their religious convictions" as if
"they started from scratch, disregarding what they presently take as
basic premises of moral thought."' 3 Citizens and judges do not aban-
don or ignore their religious convictions, for they remain "the grounds
of the political values of public reason affirmed in the political concep-
tion itself." Citizens accept and participate in the political conception
based on their comprehensive doctrines, and so do not bracket the
comprehensive in their political participation.
Rawls does not envision a complete divide between public reason
and comprehensive doctrine. When faced with the question of how to
participate in public discussion, "we hope that answer lies within the
mistrust in government, see Gifford, supra note 24, at 226 ("Rawlsian society is prone to develop
pervasive mistrust between groups of citizens, especially between the classes, as well as pervasive
mistrust between citizens and government officials.").
80. Wolgast, supra note 54, at 1939, 1947. Wolgast is especially concerned for members of
small religious sects who might not speak without violating public reason and so give other
reasons.
81. Rawls, supra note 66, at 3. The quotation continues: "Peoples' religious doctrines are
an essential part of their moral and political view; they cannot put aside that foundation, source,
or basis of their beliefs as irrelevant, or not to rely on it as a fundamental aspect of their
thought." l
82. Id. ("They must bracket, in this second sense, and hence not invoke, reasons that are
inappropriate in their role as an advisor, even when those reasons may be relevant in other
circumstances.").
83. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 244 n.33 (quoting KENT GREENAWALT, RELI-
GIOUS CONVICrIONS AND POLITCAL CHOICE 155 (1988)).
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leeway allowed by each of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines
making up an overlapping consensus. By that leeway I mean the
scope within which a doctrine can accept, even if reluctantly, the con-
clusions of public reason, either in general or in any particular case. '
Nor does Rawls ever instruct individuals on how to decide questions
within their comprehensive doctrine. "[P]olitical liberalism itself can-
not argue that each of those comprehensive doctrines should find the
conclusions of public reason nearly always within its leeway. To argue
that transcends public reason." 5 However, Rawls does insist on limits
upon comprehensive doctrines. Once citizens turn to their compre-
hensive doctrines instead of to public reason, they have turned to the
coercion of others forbidden in a constitutional democracy. Once
they do so, "others in self-defense can oppose [them] as using...
unreasonable force."86
It is perhaps here that Rawls takes his leap of faith, voicing his
hope that religious adherents will be able to accept the political con-
cepts of public reason "within the leeway," that comprehensive doc-
trines will be consistent with the demands of public reason. Rawls
acknowledges that they may not always be able to do so. For exam-
ple, "citizens recognize the familiar distinction between accepting as
(sufficiently) just and legitimate a constitution with its procedures for
fair elections and legislative majorities, and accepting as legitimate
(even when not just) a particular statute or a decision in a particular
matter of policy."' For example, Quakers may refuse to engage in
war while continuing to support a constitutional regime.88 But Rawls
is in general optimistic that comprehensive doctrines can find agree-
ment on constitutional essentials. He is optimistic that religion can be
reasonable.
84. Id. at 246 (emphasis added). On what the justice should say at the confirmation hear-
ing, Rawls says in Further Considerations, supra note 66, at 3: "I hope I may remind you that my
religion leads me to endorse a political conception of justice that supports the full range of
constitutional values and the main political institutions of our society."
85. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 246 (emphasis added). But see Greenawalt,
Some Problems, supra note 54, at 1315-17 ("If the implications of Rawls's view are as I have
indicated, his constraints of public reason do impose somewhat sharper limits on the use of
comprehensive views than I believe are appropriate.").
86. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 247. But see Galston, supra note 26, who
argues against Rawls's assumptions that comprehensive doctrines that dictate political outcomes
are unreasonable.
87. Rawls, supra note 8, at 148.
88. Id. at 148-149. The same may be true of those who reject abortion rights. Id. at 149
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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Some religious critics do not share that optimism, and instead
fear that a Rawlsian approach corrupts comprehensive doctrines,
preventing them from being critical of the political realm. The
"bracketing" criticism thus extends beyond individual moral psychol-
ogy to questions of social reform. In Rawls's account public reason
may be wrong, or at least "untrue," while an individual may know the
truth through religion. 89 What happens to justice if public reason is
mistaken, while religious adherents see the truth? Religious voices
may be prophetic and lead citizens to correct their nations' faults.90
Democratic society itself may need reform, and public reason may
blind people to injustice. Society could be harmed by the silence of
the comprehensive view. Comprehensive doctrines may be necessary
to reform society so that it attains its fundamental political values.
The truth of comprehensive doctrines may free society of injustice.
Needed social reform may be prevented if comprehensive doctrines
are ignored.
At this level, criticisms of Rawls have been historical as weli as
philosophical. Commentators argue, e.g., that it was religious insight
that guided the abolitionists and the Civil Rights Movement. Critics
claim that public reason would have gagged Martin Luther King and
the abolitionists, and so cannot be adequate as political theory.91 A
89. Rawls gives two examples of this: Quaker pacifism and Roman Catholic views of
abortion.
The example of the Quakers illustrates how this could happen. If their doctrine is true,
then pacifism is true and those who engage in war, even a just war (on the most reason-
able conception), are acting incorrectly, as judged by the true doctrine. There can be a
discrepancy in particular cases between the true doctrine and a reasonable conception
of justice. The case of abortin offers another example. The most reasonable politicaldoctrine (should th re be ne) may grant the ight of abortion in the first trimester say;
yet the Catholic doctrine denying that right as violating a divine command not to take
innocent human life may still be true. The most reasonable political conceptin cannotbe invoked to deny th t.
Rawls, supra note 66, at 26-27.
90. But see David A.J. Richards, Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent, 69 CHI.-KEr L,
RPv. 787, 835 (1994) (The abolitionist dissent was not successful because it was religious, but due
to its moral independence: "the interpretive understanding of the role of public reason in such
abolitionist dissent is no more its religious or irreligious character than its scientific or anti-
scientific character, but its critical moral independence in all domains (including science and
religion) in forging arguments of public reason in opposition to the role that both dominant
established science and religion played in the defense of slavery and racism.").
91. See Sandel, supra note 40, at 1778-82 (using the Lincoln-Douglas debates over slavery
to illustrate "the difficulty with a political conception of justice that tries to bracket controversial
moral questions"); but see Richards, supra note 90, at 838-39 (identifying and opposing these
criticisms of Rawls. Richards also points out that Martin Luther King was against the "dominant
religious opinion" of his day. "Religion as such hardly deserves the exclusive compliment of
supporting abolitionist dissent when, in fact, most of it opposed it."); Paul J. Weithman, Taking
Rites Seriously, 75 PAc. PHIL- Q. 272, 284 (1994) (mischaracterization of King's view "gives a
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political conception of justice deprived of the abolitionists, King, and
the Civil Rights Movement is no basis for an overlapping consensus.
Rawls presents the Civil Rights Movement and the abolition of slav-
ery as examples of public reason.92 But his critics see in these move-
ments the victory of a true comprehensive religion over an unjust
political conception of justice.
In response to these additional bracketing complaints, Rawls dis-
tinguishes between the "exclusive view" and the "inclusive view" of
public reason. He admits that he originally favored the former, which
holds that on fundamental political matters, citizens must not give rea-
sons in terms of their comprehensive doctrines. However, in Political
Liberalism he supports the latter. Under the inclusive view, citizens
may at times refer to their comprehensive doctrines, as long as they
meet a criterion that Rawls later builds into the public reason "pro-
viso."' 93 Citizens may speak on the "basis of political values rooted in
their comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that
strengthen the ideal of public reason itself."94
Rawls opts for the inclusive view when it supports public reason.
In a well-ordered society, the exclusive view suffices. However, if a
serious disagreement arises in a "nearly well-ordered society,"' the
inclusive view may be more appropriate. In such disputes, citizens
may doubt each other's commitment to fundamental political values.
For example, in the debate over funding for religious schools, atheists
may assume that religious citizens argue for funding on the basis of
their comprehensive doctrines, and so question believers' participa-
tion in politics. In that case, public reason is served if the parties
"explain in the public forum how one's comprehensive doctrine
affirms the political values"96 of democratic society.
democratic people a misleading interpretation of crucial events in their past" that might "lead
them to believe that religion played a different and more minimal role than in fact it did.").
92. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 251.
93. PoLrricA. LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at lii.
94. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 247 (emphasis added). But see Jackson, Love
in a Liberal Society, supra note 41, at 34 n.6 ("My objection is that the emphasis should be the
other way round: priority should be given to truths of comprehensive morality over public rea-
son, even as did King. This means, for Christians, that 'charity' is not the problematic exception
in political discourse, but the normative rule; love has 'regulative primacy,' to borrow Rawls's
phrase."); Weithman, supra note 91, at 284-85 ("[I]mplausibly strong specification of the inclu-
sive view, conduces to the further marginalization of religion from public life.").
95. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 248-49.
96. Id. at 249. But see Greenawalt, Some Problems, supra note 54, at 1316 ("Very briefly,
one might have a high degree of trust that people with other comprehensive views will, when
they rely on them, reach conclusions that are acceptable.").
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A third situation occurs when a society is not well ordered and
confronts division about its constitutional essentials. Here too the
inclusive view is warranted.
It appears from the text of Political Liberalism that Rawls moves
from the exclusive to the inclusive version of public reason because of
"bracketing" concerns. He concedes that the exclusive approach does
not permit the Christian arguments of King and the abolitionists.
However, the inclusive account of public reason is not violated by
these reformers. "In this case [abolition] the nonpublic reason of cer-
tain Christian churches supported the clear conclusions of public rea-
son. The same is true of the civil rights movement ... except that
King could appeal-as the abolitionists could not-to the political val-
ues expressed in the Constitution correctly understood. '9 7 The aboli-
tionists and the civil rights leaders did not violate public reason, "or
rather, they did not provided they thought, or on reflection would
have thought (as they certainly could have thought), that the compre-
hensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient
strength to the political conception to be subsequently realized."9 " It
was not unreasonable for Martin Luther King to use Christian lan-
guage for the sake of public reason itself.99 Here religion may serve as
97. PoLrICA LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 249-50. "Religious doctrines clearly underlie
King's views and are important in his appeals. Yet they are expressed in general terms: and they
fully support constitutional values and accord with public reason." Id. at 250 n.39.
98. Id. at 251. "The ideal also expresses a willingness to listen to what others have to say
and being ready to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in one's own view." Id. at
253. *
99. See generally Weithman, supra note 91, at 279-85 (1994) (interpreting "for the sake of
public reason"); but see Samuel Scheffler, The Appeal of Political Liberalism, 105 ETHics 4, 16-
17 (1994) (adding to King and abolitionists the examples of the Quakers, the Black churches, the
sanctuary movement, and others, and concluding, "The idea that in all such examples the reli-
ance on a comprehensive moral or religious doctrine must either be necessary to strengthen the
ideal of public reason or else unjustified seems highly questionable. And in any event, the avail-
ability of so many examples does nothing to enhance the plausibility of the idea that an overlap-
ping consensus might actually converge not only on Rawls's two principles of justice but also on
the guidelines of public reason as he describes them."); Cohen, supra note 24, at 1540 (" None of
the exceptions mentioned in Liberalism-and none added in a recent essay modifying Liber-
alism's account of public reason-would permit citizens, in the normal course of political argu-
ment, to bring the comprehensive views of others to the surface for the purpose of criticizing
those views and the political implications that flow from them. Nor does the Rawlsian view
encourage or require citizens to express their comprehensive conceptions in the course of polit-
ical debate with a view to opening those conceptions up to the challenge of public discourse.
The account of public reason may seem, then, to undervalue the importance of forms of critical
discourse that do not respect the distinction between moral and political argument and as a
result to truncate politics and practical reason.").
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paraenesis, to exhort Christians to act, and to help them learn or fol-
low public reason. In these historical circumstances, when many citi-
zens were religious, Christian language "gave a special force and
urgency to their appeal. Indeed, this special force and urgency may
have been essential in making the historical changes that eventually
came about."'l
Post-Political Liberalism, Rawls has described this inclusive
account of public reason as "too narrow,"'10' and has proposed a
"wide" (but not an "open") view of public reason. In the "wide" view,
Rawls expands the inclusive exception: "[i]n public political discourse
citizens (though not judges and other government officials) may freely
introduce their reasonable comprehensive doctrines, with one crucial
proviso: namely, that in due course they support the political meas-
ures they propose in terms of the principles and values of a public
political conception of justice."'10 2 Such an approach allows the "vital
social roots"'" 3 of the overlapping consensus to be developed and
strengthened by reminding citizens of their comprehensive doctrines.
Within this wide view, Rawls identifies different types of dis-
course. The believer may begin with declaration of her religious
beliefs, "which ends by showing how the religious view supports, or
leads to, the basic ideas of a complete political conception of jus-
tice."'1 4 In the next step, justification, citizens argue within the polit-
ical conception of justice, which their religious doctrines support. For
example, the religious believer may narrate the story of the Good
Samaritan but must then recount the arguments of public reason for
aid to the neighbor. In persuasion, we try to show other citizens that
they can support public reason based on their own comprehensive
doctrines. In witnessing, citizens do not appeal to the political concep-
tion of justice, but instead appeal to God or truth. Opposition to war
or to abortion, for example, could take this form.
Rawls rejects the "open view: anything goes and all constraints
are removed."'0 5 This view cannot be accepted because it abandons
100. Rawls, supra note 66, at 12. See Richards, supra note 90, at 787 for a lengthy defense of
the Rawlsian position in the context of the history of the abolitionists. Richards insists that the
abolitionists did meet the test of public reason; "Rawls's interpretation of such rights-based dis-
sent is ... a tribute to its interpretive scope and depth." Id. at 787.
101. Rawls, supra note 66, at 11.
102. Id. at 12.
103. Id. at 13.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 16.
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public reason. "Those who reject democracy will of course reject the
ideal of public reason."' 6
The distinction between the inclusive view and the wide view is
subtle. Even that shift, however, will not satisfy some adherents of
religions. Public reason, whether inclusive or wide, does pose a diffi-
cult challenge to them within their religious comprehensive doctrines.
Rawls would not deny this. He does not give them any guidance on
how this reconciliation of comprehensive doctrine and public reason
should take place. He does not need to do so; he does not claim to
examine all the comprehensive doctrines. But it is clear that some
comprehensive doctrines will reject the wide view. Rawls will have to
dismiss them as unreasonable, at least insofar as they try to impose
their comprehensive doctrines in the political arena.
However, one final challenge is posed by this rejection of the
open view in favor of the wide view. In this distinction, another ques-
tion of discrimination against religion arises. This is not discrimina-
tion between religious and secular thought, but between religions. 10 7
Rawls asks that theological arguments about constitutional essentials
and basic justice be translated into public reason. In so doing, Rawls
favors a religion of reason against religions that prefer to use their
distinctive arguments and are suspicious of the need to translate
everything into public reason.'0 8 Reason, after all, may corrupt rather
than clarify faith.
106. Id. at 17 ("The zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an ideal
of public reason appropriate for democratic citizenship.").
107. See Greene, supra note 24, at 670 ("Rawls' theory, however, does not treat all citizens
alike, and Rawls admits as much [citing POLTCAL LiBERALISM, supra note 1, at 138, 152, 194-
200]. Some comprehensive doctrines will hold a view of the good that is consistent with a rule of
excluding references to such doctrines from politics; other comprehensive doctrines will find it
inconsistent with their views of the good to adopt such rules of exclusion. Rawls' 'across-the-
board' rule of exclusion would have a disparate impact on the latter group of comprehensive
doctrines, thus effectively favoring the former group."); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civil Educa-
tion and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETMics 468, 478
(1995) ("The very aspiration to think about politics from a perspective that is in this way
independent of religious views and other controversial comprehensive conceptions is nonneutral:
its appeal will vary greatly among people of different faiths. Totalistic faiths (such as Vicki
Frost's belief in the Christian Bible as the 'whole truth') will be especially resistant to thinking
about politics (or anything else) from a perspective that in any ways 'brackets' the truth of their
particular religious views."); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 'He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out':
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. Rnv. 581, 616-
34 (1993) (bracketing religious beliefs takes sides in a Protestant debate).
108. See, e.g., Leedes, supra note 64, at 1108 (using example of the Amish to question polit-
ical liberalism, arguing that Rawls does not even give the Amish the protection of Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); Galston, supra note 26, at 1843 ("Rawls is forced to exclude from
his politically liberal society a wide range of comprehensive views that cannot adopt political
HeinOnline  -- 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 322 1996-1997
[Vol. 5:297 1997] RAWLSIAN LIBERALS
Religions have different accounts of the importance of reason.
Some will be more easily translated into public reason than others.
Christians have for centuries argued about religion's relationship to
faith. Rawls's account of public reason may be facially neutral, but in
impact it will favor those believers for whom reason is consistent with
religion, for whom reason is a source of religious insight. Political lib-
eralism is not compatible with all religions and not all believers can
support a constitutional regime. Justice as fairness imposes "the con-
straint of their being reasonable on comprehensive doctrines." "[A]
comprehensive doctrine [is] incompatible with public reason only if it
cannot support a reasonable political conception of justice with its
conceptions [of] society and citizen; or when on a particular question,
it does not lead to reasonable balance, or ordering, of political val-
ues."'1 9 Rawls does not elaborate on how one recognizes an "unrea-
sonable" comprehensive doctrine, but states that one needs strong
liberalism enthusiastically because their political beliefs are integrated with their other beliefs.");
Greene, supra note 24, at 668-69 ("A cogent political liberalism-acknowledging the possibility
that common-ground politics might fail to bring about the best moral order, leaving open the
theoretical chance that a sectarian theory of the good is in fact best--would recognize the legiti-
macy problem that flows from silencing certain theories of the good in politics.").
109. Rawls, supra note 66, at 6. Rawls has faced extensive criticism for his treatment of
comprehensive doctrines that reject abortion in a footnote to Political Liberalism. "Now I
believe any reasonable balance of these three values ['the due respect for human life, the
ordered reproduction of political society over time, including the family in some form, and
finally the equality of women as equal citizens'] will give a woman a duly qualified right to
decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester.... [A]ny comprehensive
doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding that duly qualified right in the first
trimester is to that extent unreasonable." POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 243 n.32
(emphasis added). For criticisms of this argument, see Gifford, supra note 24, at 218-19 (arguing
that Rawls has alienated potential supporters by "deem[ing] unreasonable any comprehensive
doctrine that would use the political process to deny a pregnant woman a right to terminate");
Greenawalt, Some Problems, supra note 54, passim (questioning public reason because it prohib-
its Catholics from relying on comprehensive views about abortion); Sandel, supra note 40, at
1778 ("But if the Catholic Church is right about the moral status of the fetus, if abortion is
morally tantamount to murder, then it is not clear why the political values of toleration and
women's equality, important though they are, should prevail."); id. at 1790 ("Relevant though it
clearly is to the question of abortion rights, Catholic moral doctrine cannot be debated in the
political arena that political liberalism defines."); Campos, supra note 24, at 1826 ("What can
one say to the modem liberal intellectual who writes that abortion cannot be prohibited in the
first trimester because 'any reasonable balance' of political values requires recognizing such a
right, and then 'explains' this conclusion by pointing out that 'at this early stage of pregnancy the
political value of the equality of women is overriding, and this right is required to give it sub-
stance and force?' Such persons can no more be argued with than those who simply declare that
a particular result is required because 'God says so."'); Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1934 ("[T]he
striking characteristic of abortion's opponents is not that their views are unreasonable, in any
sensible meaning of that term, but rather that they appear to adhere to the overlapping consen-
sus despite the existence of strongly held, and intolerantly expressed, beliefs as to the wrongness
of even a qualified right to abortion. What does this empirical fact tell us about the overlapping
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grounds before ruling a doctrine unreasonable. 110 Society remains
stable if the unreasonable doctrines "do not gain enough currency to
undermine society's essential justice.""'
Rawls's theory is clearly critical of unreasonable religions, or of
unreasonable resolutions of political questions within religions. But
religious adherents should not reject Political Liberalism for that rea-
son. In his analysis of the abolitionists' use of public reason, David
Richards reminds us that not all Christians opposed slavery; not all
Christians supported the Civil Rights Movement. According to Rich-
ards, abolitionist dissent was not successful because it was religious.
What mattered was its "critical moral independence in al domains
(including science and religion) in forging arguments of public reason
in opposition to the role that both dominant established science and
religion played in the defense of slavery and racism."' 2 "Religion as
such hardly deserves the exclusive compliment of supporting aboli-
tionist dissent when, in fact, most of it opposed it.""' Christian justifi-
cations for slavery persisted for centuries. Richards also points out
that Martin Luther King opposed the "dominant religious opinion" of
his day.1
14
Rawls has good reason to include in his theory a criterion that
can be critical of comprehensive doctrines. Reason is valuable in cor-
recting mistaken religious as well as constitutional interpretations.
His public reason requirement may foster "critical moral indepen-
dence" in comprehensive doctrines. Yet it remains noteworthy that
Rawls's purpose (in contrast, e.g., to Michael Perry) is not to provide
a theory of comprehensive doctrines. Within the constraints of his
consensus?"); Greenawalt, On Public Reason, supra note 54, passim; de Marneffe, supra note 54,
at 235 ("The issue of abortion suggests, then, that there are important liberal positions on the
scope of basic liberty that cannot be adequately defended in terms of liberal political values
alone. If so, then there are important liberal positions on the scope of basic liberty that cannot
be taken in voting or political advocacy while adhering to Rawls's idea of public reason, and this
is a serious objection to this idea from the liberal point of view."). Most of these authors men-
tion Catholics as the example of a group who would protest Rawls's public reason position on
abortion. However, some Catholics are Rawlsian about abortion, see infra note 207.
Rawls has explained that this footnote about abortion was not an argument, but an opinion
("an opinion is not an argument"). POLITICAL LIBERALISM, PAPER ED., supra note 3, at Iv n.31.
The original footnote was to "illustrate" the reasonable balance of political values on this issue.
Id. at Iv n.31. Moreover he has noted that Cardinal Bernardin's argument about abortion "is
clearly cast in the form of public reason." Id. at lvi n.32.
110. PoLrICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 59.
111. d at 39. "Reasonable pluralism" is not "pluralism as such." Id. at 36.
112. Richards, supra note 90, at 835 (emphasis added).
113. Id at 839.
114. Id. at 838.
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own theory, Rawls does not comment on the truth of individual com-
prehensive doctrines, or on their ability to accept the demands of pub-
lic reason. It is clear that not every comprehensive doctrine will be
able to use public reason.
Yet Rawls does state that "if any of those reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines supports only true moral judgments,""' 5 or "if any of
the reasonable comprehensive doctrines in the existing overlapping
consensus is true, then the political conception itself is true, or close
thereto in the sense of being endorsed by a true doctrine. 11 6 I do not
argue in this essay that Catholicism supports only true moral judg-
ments or that its reasonable comprehensive doctrines are true. That is
a task for theologians. However, Catholicism does support the Rawl-
sian conception of political justice, and so lends support to Rawls's
claim that the political conception itself is true.
In a footnote to his further considerations on public reason,
Rawls notes that "the idea of wide public reason is closely related to
ideas expressed some time ago by John Courtney Murray, S.J."' 17
There are of course some changes, which reflect the thirty-three years
since the publication of We Hold These Truths. But the similarities are
striking. To the Catholic Murray I now turn.
II. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY
A. INTERCREDAL COOPERATION
In the 1940s, Catholics faced their own questions about pluralism.
Murray's writings in that decade addressed these Catholic concerns in
the context of "intercredal cooperation," a challenge posed to Chris-
tians by the Second World War. Christians of different denomina-
tions, especially in England, were collaborating in the work of "social
reconstruction" and "social justice" in response to the ravages of the
war. Murray's early academic articles address the theological and eth-
ical problems with this collaboration.
115. POLITICAL LMERALISM, supra note 1, at 128.
116. Id. at 153 n.19. See also iU. at 128: [I]f any of those reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines supports only true moral judgments, the political conception itself is correct, or close
thereto, since it is endorsed by a true doctrine. Thus, the truth of any one doctrine in the consen-
sus guarantees that all the reasonable doctrines yield the right conception of political justice,
6ven though they do not do so for the right reasons as specified by the one true doctrine."
117. Rawls, supra note 66, at 13 n.27 (citing JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1965), and JotiN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THEsE TRUTHS
(1960)).
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Such cooperation was important and valuable work; the war,
after all, threatened civilization as Christians knew it. It posed special
"danger and difficulty""' to Catholics, however. Catholics believed
that theirs was the one true religion. Collaboration with non-
Catholics threatened to undermine or compromise that true faith. An
obvious danger is that individuals in groups with members of different
faiths learn about other religions and convert to those faiths. More
worrisome was the problem of "indifferentism," which plagued Mur-
ray throughout his career." 9 Catholicism is the one true religion. Yet
if Catholics cooperate with other Christians, all religions appear equal
in the truth. The important differences between Catholicism and
other churches are obscured. The public witness contradicts the Cath-
olic truth claims. Critics of these groups argued that Catholic cooper-
ators become "unduly tolerant"'20 toward other religions. They
succumb to "the danger, namely, of some yielding of dogmatic integ-
rity, some subordination of religion to temporal interest." " ' An addi-
tional concern is that Catholics privatize their own religious
commitments in these groups, where they are prevented from pro-
claiming the truth of the Catholic faith, silenced by their collaborators.
Catholics in the '40s faced this difficult question: "can we in com-
plete loyalty to the truth, and in perfect integrity of conscience, come
together in a unity of co-operative action for the solution of our com-
mon temporal problems?"" 2 Murray provided a theological rationale
for cooperation. He insisted that Catholics should not compromise
their religious commitments and should hold firmly to the truth of
their religion. Murray always affirmed the truth of Catholicism. True
faith does set limits to one's religious cooperation. "For instance, for-
mal Catholic participation in an act of interconfessional worship
would imply a doctrinal and ecclesiastical unity with the non-Catholic
participants that would be contradictory of the Catholic Unity of the
Church as a reality with definite frontiers."'1 Catholics could never
118. John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: Christian Co-operation, 3 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 413, 413 (1942) [hereinafter Murray, Christian Co-operation].
119. Id. at 414. Indifferentism had been condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus of Errors.
See "indifferentism" and "Syllabus of Errors" entries in THE HARPERCOLLINS ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CATHOLICISM 662, 1233 (Richard P. McBrien ed., 1995).
120. Murray, Christian Co-operation, supra note 118, at 414.
121. Id. at 422.
122. John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: Co-operation--Some Further Views, 4 THEO.
LOGICAL STUD. 100, 108 (1943) [hereinafter Murray, Some Further Views].
123. John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: Intercredal Co-operation: Its Theory and Its
Organization, 4 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 257, 257 (1943) [hereinafter Murray, Intercredal Co-opera-
tion ].
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accept "interdenominational Christianity as a religious system."' 24
"[T]here is no suggestion of 'equating churches,' or of countenancing
the idea that a man may freely choose from among a variety of ecclesi-
astical allegiances, as if all were equally valid for eternal salvation.' '1 25
However, in Murray's argument, "interconfessional agreement
on certain necessary religious and moral bases of a just social
order"'126 is permitted and does not contradict Catholic faith. "Prop-
erly understood, these agreements leave the integrity of Catholic faith
untouched." 27 Such agreement is rooted in the natural law, upon
which Murray relied consistently in his social and political writings
throughout his life. The natural law provides common principles to all
human persons, of different religious beliefs. On these principles,
Catholics may cooperate with creeds that are not true. In the '40s,
Murray did not elaborate on the natural law principles which he
would develop at length later in his career. But the natural law clearly
allows cooperation for the work of social justice. "The separation of
the divergent doctrines on church unity from a theory of co-operation
is quite possible, and would do violence to neither party in their reli-
gious convictions. Such a separation leaves intact their mutually-
shared doctrine of human unity, whose bond is the law of nature.' 1 28
Cooperation on natural law grounds was not only possible in theory,
but was already taking place in practice, in England, where "co-opera-
tion between Catholics and non-Catholics ... is explicitly based on the
ground of a common acceptance of the natural law."' 29 Such coopera-
tion should occur in the United States as well.
Murray's critics feared cooperation, even at the natural law or
moral level. For example, Paul Hanly Furfey argued that "Catholics
may freely co-operate with non-Catholics in arranging a Fourth of July
celebration, in favoring or opposing proportional representation, or in
organizing a new insurance company," as well as in some aspects of
124. Id. at 272. Murray insists that such cooperation cannot be used to found a "'super
organization' that would somehow consider itself an interdenominational 'church."'
"[C]ooperation does not create any interdenominational unity among 'religions."' John
Courtney Murray, The Pattern for Peace and the Papal Peace Program, in BRIGING THE
SACRED AND THE SECULAR 6, 15,17 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1994) [hereinafter Murray, Pattern for
Peace].
125. Murray, Pattern for Peace supra note 124, at 15.
126. Murray, Intercredal Co-operation, supra note 123, at 272.
127. Id.
128. Murray, Some Further Views, supra note 122, at 109.
129. Murray, Christian Co-operation, supra note 118, at 430.
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"our peculiarly American type of labor movement.' 130  However,
Furfey opposed cooperative actions "which by their very nature touch
directly on fundamental moral and religious principles."' 31 Furfey
argued that the discussion of moral principles heightens people's reli-
gious differences, and so encourages indifferentism. Furfey advocated
"parallel" cooperation, with separate Catholic groups working with
non-Catholic groups on common problems.' 32 An overlapping coop-
eration was too dangerous to the faith.
Unlike other Catholics of his era, Murray accepted religious plu-
ralism, especially in the United States. At the same time he insisted
that Catholicism is true. Even at this early date, Murray recognized
that Catholics (especially American Catholics) live "within the con-
text of a society that will, as a matter of fact, continue for a long time
to be religiously pluralistic."' 33 "Whether we like it or not, we are
living in a religiously pluralist society at a time of spiritual crisis; and
the alternatives are the discovery of social unity, or destruction.' ' 34
With Rawls he sees the importance of consensus amidst pluralism.
Murray urged a practical resolution of the theological problem. Chris-
tians had to work together on matters of social reconstruction and
justice. They could find common ground in these areas without
appeals to religious truth, and without compromise of religious truth.
The virtues of a practical solution should not be underestimated.
Intercredal cooperation was not problem-free. It might tempt
some individuals to indifferentism or scandalize some Catholics.
However, the solution was not refusal to cooperate in the work of
social justice and reform. Instead, the burden shifts to Catholic educa-
tion. Catholics must be taught to understand the grounds on which
they cooperate and to understand that such cooperation is not incon-
sistent with their faith in the one true church.
Murray does not employ Rawls's expression that the virtues of
stability are "very great virtues." But his writings in the midst of the
130. Paul Hanly Furfey, To the Editor, 4 THEOLOGICAL STuD. 467, 467 (1943).
131. Id. at 467. He includes here divorce, birth control, Communism, Fascism, the ethics of
war, fundamental race relations, and the labor question as a whole.
132. But see John Courtney Murray, To the Editor, 4 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 472, 474 (1943)
("The concept of parallel co-operation would hardly permit an essential part of the papal pro-
gram, namely, a respectful but vigorous educative action on the thought, attitudes, sympathies,
etc. of our separated brethren, with a view to persuading them that our social doctrine and
program does appeal to the collective conscience of mankind, and can command their honest
assent.").
133. Murray, Some Further Views, supra note 122, at 100.
134. Murray, Intercredal Co-operation, supra note 123, at 274.
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Second World War convey the urgency of agreement about the social
order in the midst of religious pluralism. "When it is a question of a
common effort to combat inadequate housing, alcoholism, or the
exploitation of the economically underprivileged, I do not first have to
ask my associate whether he believes in the divinity of Christ."'135
Murray did not believe that people who work together for justice have
to share a common motivation or converse about their common con-
victions. Moreover, he supported practical solutions to social
problems, even if they posed theoretical difficulties: "what is being
sought everywhere today, is a practical solution to a concrete prob-
lem, whose terms we cannot change at will. 1 36 Murray acknowledged
frankly-and practically-that "Catholic social action alone, for all its
intrinsic resources, is simply not up to the enormity of the task that
confronts it with frightening urgency.'
' 37
For Murray, the "Declaration on World Peace" by Catholics,
Protestants, and Jews illustrated the benefits of cooperation; to his
opponents it represented the dangers. Catholics, Protestants, and
Jews issued the statement in agreement about the moral bases for a
new world order. "The Declaration did not, of course, contain the full
Catholic program, nor, for that matter, the full Protestant or Jewish
program, nor even a full statement of the points of agreement in the
three programs.""'s Yet Catholics, Protestants, and Jews agreed on
the essentials. Religious adherents can retain their distinctive com-
mitments while working together for peace. They can cooperate for
peace without abandoning their comprehensive doctrines.
This concern with cooperation among religious groups led Mur-
ray to begin his examination of religious freedom. Murray devoted
much of his later career to this question. The Declaration on Religious
Freedom (1965) at the Second Vatican Council, which reversed centu-
ries of Catholic teaching on religious liberty, is due primarily to his
efforts. In 1945 he was examining religious freedom in terms of "the
question of a common stand," i.e., the common ground on which reli-
gious groups can agree.' 39 Murray concluded that religious groups
take a common stand in this manner:
135. Murray, Some Further Views, supra note 122, at 105.
136. Murray, Intercredal Co-operation, supra note 123, at 274.
137. Murray, The Pattern for Peace, supra note 124, at 14.
138. Id. at 6.
139. John Courtney Murray, Freedom of Religion, I: The Ethical Problem, 6 THEOLOGICAL
STuD. 229, 239 (1945).
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(1) we can reach an important measure of agreement on the ethical
plane; (2) we must agree to disagree on the theological plane; (3) but
we can reach harmony of action and mutual confidence on the polit-
ical plane, in virtue of the agreement previously established on the
ethical plane, as well as in virtue of a shared concern for the com-
mon good of the political community, international and national. 140
The ethical plane corresponded to the natural law; the theological
plane involved canon law; the political plane related to civil law.
In a pluralistic society, Murray's plane of agreement amidst plu-
ralism was the ethical plane of the natural law; he devoted much of his
writing to this natural law theory. But "harmony" and "mutual confi-
dence" occur in the political realm, the real realm of consensus. There
individuals "agree to disagree" on theological (and possibly on ethi-
cal) questions. The political realm united citizens on common ground
in the midst of religious pluralism. The common ground is reason.
Let us call it public reason, although Murray called it natural law, rea-
son, or public philosophy:
Our subsistent theological disagreements will cease to generate sus-
picion and separatism on the level of social life, when both sides
have the assurance that their opposing theologies of the Church are
projected against the background of an ethic of conscience and a
philosophy of political life that are based on reason, that are there-
fore mutually acceptable, and that are not destroyed by the dis-
agreements in ecclesiology.'
41
Murray's writings on intercredal cooperation were controversial
in his era. They introduced solutions to the problem of pluralism that
he pursued in more depth for the rest of his life. They show some
similarities to Rawls's struggles with a different era of pluralism fifty
years later. Murray accepts religious pluralism, yet insists on the truth
140. Id. at 239-40 (emphasis added).
It is this third objective that is presently desirable--in fact, strictly necessary; for both
Catholics and Protestants have a common obligation to preserve harmony of action and
mutual confidence on the political plane, in the interests of their common good--public
peace, civic friendship, the reign of justice in social life, temporal prosperity .... Here,
therefore, is our problem-a common problem: While preserving intact our theological
disagreement (which has its own grounds), how shall we abolish mutual distrust, and
strengthen our social unity, civic amity, harmony of action and mutual confidence in a
common pursuit of the common good? Obviously, the dilemma is not to be solved by
abolishing one of its horns, the theological disagreement.
141. Id. at 240-41. "This ethic of conscience and this political philosophy will stand guaran-
tee that our respective theologies can under no circumstances have such implications in the tem-
poral order as would be injurious to the integrity of conscience, be it Catholic or Protestant." Id.
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of his religion. Disagreements on the truth need not bar social agree-
ment. People of different religions find common ground in the polit-
ical plane. Agreement looks possible but more difficult on the ethical
plane.
However, in his first articles Murray was addressing a limited
question of social cooperation by some Christians in the unique cir-
cumstances of the Second World War. Murray had yet to examine the
problems of political liberalism. He did so after the war, however,
when he wrote extensively on church-state theory. In doing so, he
confronted one of Catholicism's fiercest enemies-Liberalism. In the
1940s and 1950s Catholics were not Rawlsian liberals. 42
B. CHURCH AND STATE
Already in the writings of Murray and his opponents on inter-
credal cooperation, the spectre of liberalism appears. Furfey sounded
the warning about liberalism, a warning that reverberates today in
religious criticisms of Political Liberalism.
We have been ineffective because we have been too uncritically co-
operative. We have been so feverishly anxious to co-operate with
liberals and all sorts of people that we have kept our distinctively
Catholic social doctrine in the background. To the general public
we have not emphasized our faith in supernatural means, in all that
is distinctively Catholic in the Encyclicals. Our Catholic social doc-
trine, as presented by many of our leaders, must appear to outsiders
as a sort of expurgated liberalism."43
Furfey expressed the fear that religious cooperation with the liberal
state weakens comprehensive doctrines. Furfey urged the church "to
become more aggressively Catholic, not less so." 44 Murray disagreed;
we have seen that he favored cooperation by Catholics on natural law
grounds. Yet Murray had his own differences with liberalism. He was
careful to distinguish Catholic from liberal cooperation:
The Catholic takes hold of the social end, and asks for agree-
ment on the natural religious and moral principles of social unity
and peace; he, therefore, reduces religious pluralism to unity on the
social plane, and thus reaches a practical (though not ideal) solution
of the problem. The "liberal" takes hold of the religious end of the
142. For the relationship between Catholicism and Liberalism, see generally R. BRUCE
DOUGLASS & DAVID HOLLENBACH, CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO
AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1994).
143. Furfey, supra note 130, at 471 (emphasis added).
144. Id.
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problem, and asks for agreement on certain "fundamentals of Chris-
tianity"; he, therefore, reduces religious pluralism to unity on the
religious plane, and thus solves-absolutely nothing. For a false
solution in the religious order cannot be a true one in the social
order. On his basis, the Catholic can appeal to the conscience of
mankind for support and co-operation, as Pius XII has done; for his
solution respects at once the exigencies of truth and the rights of
conscience, both Catholic and non-Catholic. On the contrary, the
"liberal" solution rests ultimately on a sentimentalism that confuses
all the values, both religious and social, that he sincerely wishes to
protect; and it leads inevitably to a brutal realism that denies all his
values.14
5
Under this description Rawls is more Catholic than liberal in his
refusal to seek the unity of comprehensive doctrines and in his insis-
tence that citizens participate in the overlapping consensus based on
these doctrines. We see again how important it was for Murray to
maintain the truth of his comprehensive doctrine while uniting with
others on the political plane. Rawls's theory respects that
commitment.
Having resolved to his own satisfaction the Catholic issue of
intercredal cooperation, Murray was left with a far more difficult
problem. It was one thing for Catholics to work with non-Catholics in
social organizations, or in groups committed to social reform, but
quite another for Catholics and non-Catholics to cooperate in political
society, and specifically in the state. Murray identified the political as
common ground for different religious individuals, but this argument
had serious implications for the institutional relationship of church to
state. As he developed his account of the Catholic relationship to the
state, Murray battled both liberals and Catholics.
In the nineteenth century the Roman Catholic Church con-
fronted its loss of political power, in particular the loss of the papal
states. Some European nations confiscated church property and the
church lost its privileged position in some historically "Catholic"
nations. These changes left the church to reconfigure its relationship
to the modem state. The popes attacked the liberal reforms that had
145. Murray, Intercredal Co-operation, supra note 123, at 273-74. "The Catholic solution, on
the other hand, rests ultimately on a hard intellectualist position-the distinction between the
natural and the supernatural order, and the enduring validity of nature within the order of grace.
Because of this distinction, every affirmation of nature-in the concrete, of the religio-ethical
bases of society-so long as it is simply an affirmation, is entirely Catholic." Id. at 275.
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provoked the changes in Europe. Papal documents condemned liber-
alism and in particular the liberal reforms of the separation of church
and state, religious liberty, and freedoms of speech and press. 46
By the time that Murray addressed Catholicism's relationship to
the modern state, the dominant account of Catholic church-state the-
ory was the thesis/hypothesis distinction. Its central premise (as in
any Catholic theory) was that Catholicism is the one true religion.
Because Catholicism is the one true religion, it should be the estab-
lished religion of the state. Establishment is necessary because the
church is never concerned only with the spiritual or the supernatural.
The state is to establish the one true church and to govern in accord-
ance with Catholic principles.
Liberal reforms had threatened, at times ended, the church's
establishment in Europe. The thesis/hypothesis language evolved in
reaction to those reforms. The thesis states that Catholicism should
be the established religion of the state. By the twentieth century,
however, Catholics knew that Catholicism was not always the estab-
lished religion, and that it would be difficult to gain or regain estab-
lished status in some nations. The difficult question was how to
interpret this situation. Could Catholics accept non-establishment?
Must they always support establishment? As Murray put it,
Does the dogmatic concept, "the freedom of the Church," entail by
necessary consequence the constitutional concept, "the religion of
the state," in such wise that, where the latter concept does not
obtain, an inherent right of the Church is violated and the constitu-
tional situation can therefore be the object only of toleration, on
grounds of factual necessity, the lesser evil, etc.?147
146. See generally ANTHONY RHODES, THE POWER OF ROME IN THE TwENTIT CENTURY
(1983). For the relationship of Catholicism to liberal democracy, see generally Paul Sigmund,
Catholicism and Liberal Democracy, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTMONS TO
AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 142, at 217-41.
147. John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: On Religious Freedom, 10 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 409, 422 (1949) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Murray, On Religious Freedom]. See also
id at 423 (emphasis added) ("Is this constitutional concept, as applied in the nation-state, simply
a particular and contingent, historically and politically conditioned realization of the dogmatic
concept, 'the freedom of the Church,' in such wise that, even where it does not obtain, all the
inherent exigencies of the freedom of the Church may still be adequately realized and the consti-
tutional situation may be the object of approval in principle as good in itself?"); John Courtney
Murray, Government Repression of Heresy, 3 PROC. CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL SOC'Y AM. 26,33-
37, 66 (1948) (The spiritual, not political power of the church is now the thesis.) [hereinafter
Murray, Government Repression].
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Many Catholic writers in Murray's age believed that a non-Cath-
olic state was the "hypothesis" that had to be tolerated as an evil.148
Catholics had to tolerate non-establishment because they could do no
better. The thesis is establishment; the hypothesis is non-establish-
ment. The thesis is good; the hypothesis is evil. The corollary was
clear: Catholics could tolerate the hypothesis, but were obligated to
change the hypothesis to thesis when they could do so. The slogan
connected to this theory was "Error has no rights.1 49 This slogan
raised an additional issue about the thesis/hypothesis that Murray
addressed later in his life, i.e., the question of public worship.
Catholics in the minority clearly have the right to public worship; their
religion is true. But error does not have "rights" to public worship.1 50
Non-Catholics in the minority should not have the right to public
worship.
The thesis/hypothesis is a striking illustration of a Rawlsian
modus vivendi that is not an overlapping consensus. Rawls is gener-
ous to use as his example sixteenth century Catholics; twentieth cen-
tury Catholics still wanted to change the settlement. Catholics know
that they do not always have the political clout to be the established
religion of the state. Therefore, they must tolerate their non-estab-
lishment in some nations. Should that situation change, however, then
148. Murray, On Religious Freedom, supra note 147, at 420 ("And the practical question
was, whether this or that nation-state was in the situation of 'thesis' or of 'hypothesis.' If the
latter, a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was the rule; if the former, the constitu-
tional concept, 'religion of the state,' had to apply. And there you were.").
149. THE HARPERCOLLINS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLICiSM, supra note 119, at 476.
150. See John Courtney Murray, Religious Freedom, in FREEDOM AND MAN 134-35 (J.C.
Murray ed., 1965) for a summary of this position [hereinafter Murray, Religious Freedom]. See
also THoMAs T. LOVE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY: CONTEMPORARY CHURCH-STATE THEORY
29-30 (1965) ("The view of the conservative Catholic may be summarized as follows: (1) There
is only one true Church or religion; it is the highest good for man; hence, the state must aid the
Church positively and defend it from all attacks. This is to say that only the Catholic Church is
to have full religious liberty. (2) All other so-called religions are in error and error does not
have the same rights as truth. Error must not be freely propagated. Individual persons are, of
course, free to be in error, but such persons are not to be permitted to gather with others of
similar error and to propagate error. The conservative wishes to contain error by legally prohib-
iting public assemblage and propagation. (3) If Catholics are in a majority (e.g., Spain, Colom-
bia) they are to oppose the external and public freedom of those holding different religious
beliefs. However, if Catholics are in the minority they are to ask for religious freedom. It is
rationally expedient to put up with the existing situation until a future time, until the minority
becomes the majority or certain power structures change. At some more opportune time
through some form of legitimate political power (e.g., majority, concordat) the Roman Catholic
Church will be able to establish itself in its proper preferential status. (4) The conditions upon
which it might again become rationally expedient to actualize the rights of the true religion are
so impossible of fulfillment, and that epoch so distant, as to be almost unimaginable, even in so-
called 'Catholic' lands.").
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Catholics should advocate a change in their nation's political struc-
ture, so that Catholicism becomes the established religion. If the the-
sis/hypothesis is the correct account of Roman Catholic church-state
theory, then the separation of church and state is clearly wrong, an
evil to be tolerated.
Murray opposed this interpretation of the thesis/hypothesis. He
based his argument on lengthy analyses of papal documents, which I
will not review here. He used the language of his comprehensive doc-
trine to challenge fellow Catholics to reinterpret that comprehensive
doctrine. Although his focus was papal doctrine he was guided and
inspired by his experience of the separation of church and state in the
United States. Murray argued that the papal documents had to be
read as a response to Continental liberalism; "[t]he Liberalism con-
demned by the Church is rightly written with a capital L."'151 What
Liberalism stands for, and what Catholics cannot accept, is the "abso-
lute autonomy of the individual reason," and the "political principle of
the juridical omnipotence of the state."'52 "What [Liberals] really
wanted to achieve was a completely secularized society"' 53 -the
charge still made against Rawlsian liberalism. Like Rawls, Murray
defended a liberalism that allowed a proper role for comprehensive
doctrines.
The popes' critiques of the liberal state made some sense on the
Continent. However, Murray argued that the thesis/hypothesis, estab-
lishment/non-establishment rule differed in the historical context of
the United States. In the 1950s, American Catholics were often
accused of desiring to impose Catholic or papal rule on the United
States. That fear had waylaid the presidential aspirations of Alfred E.
Smith. John F. Kennedy's advisors consulted with Murray as Kennedy
faced those charges in his presidential campaign and as he prepared
his address to the Houston ministers. 54 The thesis-hypothesis distinc-
tion fueled such fears. If thesis/hypothesis was the correct interpreta-
tion of Catholic teaching, then Catholics, a minority in the United
States, should tolerate the separation of church and state as an evil
151. John Courtney Murray, How Liberal is Liberalism?, 75 AMERICA 6, 6 (1946) [hereinaf-
ter Murray, How Liberal]; see also JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS:
CATHOLIC REFLECrIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 67 (1960) [hereinafter MURRAY, WE
HOLD].
152. Murray, How Libera4 supra note 151, at 6.
153. Id. at 7.
154. DONALD E. PELOTrE, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY: THEOLOGIAN IN CoNFLicr 76
(1975).
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and work to establish Catholicism if they had the opportunity. Some
Catholic writers proposed Spain as the thesis and the United States as
the hypothesis; American Catholics should prefer to be governed by a
Spanish-style state.
Murray vigorously opposed this interpretation of the constitu-
tional separation of church and state in the United States. "Are we to
suppose that 30,000,000 Catholics must live perpetually in a state of
'hypothesis'?"'155 Murray denied that "civil intolerance is inherent in
the Catholic doctrine of the Church and the state."'56 Catholic partic-
ipation in the United States was not the toleration of an evil, but "has
been a matter of conscience and conviction, because its motive was
not expediency in the narrow sense-the need to accept what one is
powerless to change."' 57 Murray reinterpreted the thesis/hypothesis
distinction in his analysis of the religion of the state. He reworded the
thesis. He argued that an (established) religion of the state is not "a
permanent and necessary part of the 'thesis.""15  The relationship of
church to state is not an abstract, ahistorical concept. The church's
155. ld. at 38; see also id at 46 ("Pius XII had demolished 'the false idea' that the Spanish
system stood for a 'thesis' and the American system merely for a 'hypothesis."').
156. Murray, Government Repression, supra note 147, at 26; see also John Courtney Murray,
Leo XIII and Pius XII Government and the Order of Religion, in RELiGIous LIBER'Y: CATiO.
LTC STRUGGLES wrri PLURALISM 49, 97 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1993) ("The former view in its
more extreme expositions has given rise to widespread belief that when Catholics possess the
requisite political power they are obliged in principle to use the coercive force of government to
repress other religious beliefs, more or less severely; whereas when they lack political power
they suspend their principle, recur to expediency, and defend a general civil right to the free
exercise of religion. In other words, Catholics are intolerant when it is possible to be intolerant;
they are tolerant only when it is necessary to be tolerant. Intolerance is the ideal, justified by
principle; tolerance is an evil, justified as a lesser evil by factual circumstances. If this popular
belief is true Catholic doctrine, it is indeed good that it is popular. But if it is not true, its
popularity is a scandal.") [hereinafter Murray, Leo XIII and Pius XlI].
157. MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 43.
158. Murray, On Religious Freedom, supra note 147, at 423.
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teaching about the state must reflect historical change.'59 "[T]he dis-
cussion must proceed from an historical point of view. Nothing is
more unhelpful than an abstract starting point."'160
Murray insisted on an inductive, not deductive, approach to Cath-
olic social ethics.161 "The two links [between religious freedom and
limited constitutional government and between the freedom of the
church and of the people] were not forged by abstract deductive logic
but by history, by the historical advance of totalitarian government,
and by the corresponding new appreciation of man's dignity in
society."' 62
Murray, like Rawls, adopted a political theory that was histori-
cally situated and abandoned a comprehensive political theory that
would apply in all times and all places. That type of theory had led to
the thesis/hypothesis failure. Murray grew wary of theories that
offered comprehensive, abstract, and historical doctrines of church
and state.
159. Id. at 425. ("However, the cardinal question-not indeed unrelated to the foregoing
ones-concerns, as I said, the relation between the constitutional concept, 'religion of the state,'
and the dogmatic concept, 'the freedom of the Church.' The standing of this constitutional con-
cept within the framework of Catholic doctrine turns on the nature of this relation, whether it is
necessary and absolute, or conditioned and historical. Admittedly, this concept may be a means
to the preservation of a particular national unity or to the maintenance of the integrity of a
particular national culture; as such, however, it cannot claim the patronage of the Church or of
Catholic doctrine; for national unities and cultures do not rank as ends or values proper to the
Church, nor is her doctrine a means to them. The only proper point of reference is the freedom
of the Church, which is the single necessary end that the Church directly seeks in her relations
with political society. Consequently, only insofar as the constitutional concept, 'religion of the
state,' is a means to this end can it claim any doctrinal standing. The question then is, what kind
of a means is it? Is it a permanently necessary means apart from which the freedom of the
church cannot be properly secure? If so, it becomes a constitutional 'ideal' by this relation to a
dogmatic 'ideal,' and can claim to be 'thesis,' as the freedom of the Church is 'thesis.' If not, it
sinks to the rank occupied by other constitutional institutionalizations of principle-the rank of a
relative, not an absolute, a valid and valuable institution that can be defended in a context but
that need not and cannot be proclaimed an 'ideal."').
160. See also Murray, Government Repression, supra note 147, at 33.
161. For discussion of the inductive method in Catholic social (but not sexual) ethics, see
generally MARIE-DOMINIQUE CHENU, LA "DocRNE SocIAii" DE L'EGLISE COMlViE IDtO-
LoGi (1979); CHARn.s E. CURRAN, MORAL THEOLOGY: A CONMNUING JOURNEY 173-208
(1982).
162. PELO-IT, supra note 154, at 115-16. See also Murray, Religious Freedom, supra note
150, at 137-38 ("Therefore argument about human rights, including religious freedom, has to be
informed by historical consciousness, by an awareness that demands inherent in the nature of
man manifest themselves and come to recognition in history, under the impact of developing
human experience. Deductive argument therefore is not enough. Good moral philosophy, like
all good philosophy, must begin with man's historical experience and undertake to discern in it
the intentions of human nature, the rational imperatives that rise from the depths of the concrete
human person, the dictates of reason that claim affirmation as natural law.").
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Murray argued that the thesis is the freedom of the church, not
the establishment of the church.163
Since the institution of the state-church was an adaptation to a par-
ticular historical context, it does not represent a permanent and
unalterable exigence of Catholic principles, to be realized in any
and all historical situations in which there is verified the general
hypothesis of a "Catholic population." This legal institution need
not be defended by Catholics as a sort of transtemporal "ideal," the
single and only institutionalized form of Church-State relationships
which can claim the support of principles, the unique "thesis" beside
which all other solutions to the Church-State problem must be
regarded as "hypothesis," provisional concessions to force
majeure.164
Murray preferred the language of principle and application of princi-
ple to thesis and hypothesis. The application of principles changes in
changing circumstances. 65 "What necessitates changing applications
of principle and a vital process of adaptation is the changing character
of 'the state.""' In the United States, separation is not the thesis or
the principle. Instead, the First Amendment of the United States pro-
tects the thesis/principle of the freedom of the church. To the
Catholics, American as well as Roman, who had argued that the
United States violated per se the Catholic thesis, Murray demon-
strated that the First Amendment protected the liberty of the church
espoused by all the popes. Time magazine put him on its cover after
Kennedy's election in recognition of the intellectual work he had done
163. John Courtney Murray, Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and
State in the Light of History, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 177, 224 (1949) ("There is first the free
obedience of the Christian conscience to the magisterial and jurisdictional authority of the
Church; there is secondly the free participation of the citizen, as a Christian, in the institutions
whereby all the processes of temporal life are directed to their proper ends.") [hereinafter Mur-
ray, Contemporary Orientations].
164. John Courtney Murray, The Problem of State Religion, 12 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 155,
161 (1951) [hereinafter Murray, State Religion]. See also Murray, Contemporary Orientations,
supra note 163, at 229 ("For the theologian, the basic question concerns that constitutional situa-
tion itself--is it or is it not the theologically necessary, permanently valid, unalterably ideal reali-
zation of Catholic principles on Church-state relationships, in such wise that any constitutional
situation which deviates from it can be the object only of 'toleration,' not of approval in princi-
ple-a concession to the exigencies of an 'hypothesis,' prompted by expediency, and not the
embodiment of a 'thesis,' warranted by theological and political doctrine. In other words, the
question is whether the concept of libertas ecclesiastica by intrinsic exigence requires political
embodiment in the concept of 'the religion of the state,' with the 'logical and juridical conse-
quences' that have historically followed from that concept. Surely the answer must be no.").
165. Murray, State Religion, supra note 164, at 160.
166. Id.
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to demonstrate that Catholics could be American citizens, politicians,
and presidents.
Murray's writings were addressed to a Catholic audience, but not
only to a Catholic audience; he frequently commented on the role of
religion in the United States. In his essays on intercredal cooperation
and church-state theory, he was proposing positions that had implica-
tions for political philosophy or political liberalism. Moreover, in the
1950s, his arguments were important to the American public, whose
anti-Catholic sentiment was strong, with animosity exacerbated at the
end of the decade by the presidential campaign of a Roman Catholic.
Yet many of his articles were primarily arguments "within" a compre-
hensive doctrine, interpreting what the Catholic tradition said about
the church and the state for theologians.
Within his comprehensive doctrine, Murray paid a price for his
opinions. In 1954 he was ordered by Rome to desist from writing
about church and state. The effect on Murray is expressed in his letter
to a fellow Jesuit:
All the books on Church and State and on allied topics have been
cleared from my room, in symbol of retirement, which I expect to
be permanent. When Frank Sheed returns, I shall cancel the agree-
ment I had with him to edit and revise the articles on Church and
State for a book. Fortunately, my gloomy prescience impelled me
to refuse an invitation to give the Walgreen Lectures at the U. of
Chicago. And all other practical measures will be taken to close the
door on the past ten years, leaving all their mistakenesses to
God.167
He began to send his manuscripts to Rome for approval before pubi-
cation; approval was at times denied.6 8
Murray moved to different topics, while continuing to struggle
with the weaknesses in his church-state theory. In 1945, Murray had
rooted religious freedom in a political principle. At that time, he
interpreted religious liberty in terms of the duties of the state to the
common good, as a political compromise, if you will.169 By the 1950s,
Murray rooted the principle of religious freedom in the dignity of the
human person, all human persons. Religious freedom was no longer a
right for Catholics only, but a right of human persons. The right of
167. PELOTrE, supra note 154, at 53.
168. Id. at 52.
169. See John Courtney Murray, Current Theology: Freedom of Religion, 6 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 85, 98 (1945) (describing religious liberty as a political principle).
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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religious freedom was not dependent on the truth of one's religious
doctrine. It did not belong to Catholics only.
Murray was eventually vindicated by the Second Vatican Council,
which met in Rome from 1962-1965. He was "disinvited" from the
early sessions of the Council.7 0 Then Cardinal Spellman appointed
him a peritus. Murray's early opponent, "the dark spectre that
brooded over the conciliar debates-the historical and doctrinal spec-
tre of religious indifferentism"' 7' was present. The bishops battled
fiercely over the Council documents, to maintain or change the tradi-
tional thesis. Murray's influence is evident in the Council's Declara-
tion on Religious Freedom.'7 2 With the Declaration, the church
recognized the "affirmation of religious freedom as a human and civil
right," "the right of the person."'7" The "schema on religious freedom
was often called the 'American schema"' because it "derived its basic
inspiration from the American experience."'174 It was Murray's
schema. The modus vivendi was finally over.175
C. Two THERE ARE: CHURCH AND STATE
The problem of religious pluralism was "solved" by Murray by
turning to a political, and then an ethical principle, and not a theologi-
cal one. In Murray's view, Catholicism was still the one true religion.
To his opponents, that truth had meant that only Catholics had rights
170. CHARLES E. CURRAN, AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHics 177 (1982).
171. John Courtney Murray, Declaration on Religious Freedom: Commentary, in AMERICAN
PARTICIPATION AT THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL 668, 673 (V.A.Yzermans ed., 1967) [herein-
after Murray, Commentary].
172. Second Vatican Council, Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF
VATICAN II 675 (Walter M. Abbott, SJ. ed., 1966).
173. See Murray, Religious Freedom, supra note 150, at 134-35.
174. Murray, Commentary, supra note 171, at 668.
175. See also John Courtney Murray, The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in BRIDGING
THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR, supra note 124, at 198-99:
Therefore, the Declaration on Religious Freedom puts aside the post-Reformation and
19th-century of civil tolerance. The fault is not error but archaism. A new philosophy
of society and state has been elaborated, more transtemporal in its manner of concep-
tion and statement, less time-conditioned, more differentiated, a progress in the under-
standing of the tradition. Briefly, the structural elements of this philosophy are the
four principles of social order stated, and developed in their exigencies, in Pacem in
terris-the principles of truth, justice, love and freedom. The declaration of the human
and civil right to the free exercise of religion is not only in harmony with, but also
required by, these four principles. The foundation of the right is the truth of human
dignity. The object of the right-freedom from coercion in religious matters--is the first
debt due in justice to the human person. The final motive for respect of the right is a
love of appreciation of the personal dignity of man. Religious freedom itself is the first
of all freedoms in a well-organized society, without which no other human and civil
freedoms can be safe.
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to religious freedom. Murray sought agreement on religious freedom
apart from the truth claims of religion. The right inhered in human
persons. This identification of a human, not Catholic, right to reli-
gious freedom was accompanied by a recognition of the autonomy of
the state.
Within his comprehensive doctrine, Murray identified a realm
"independent" (could we say "freestanding"?) of his comprehensive
doctrine, a realm that all human persons inhabit without reference to
their comprehensive doctrines. Behind his interpretation of the the-
sis/hypothesis lay a vision of politics as the realm in which humans of
all comprehensive doctrines find common ground. "Political unity is
now a particular order of unity in its own right, and it has its own
foundations, which are not necessarily a unity in supernatural faith.
Citizenship and all the rights of the citizen rest on purely political
grounds."' 76 In the United States, Americans shared a common
ground of political citizenship based on the natural law.
Murray argued that church and state were separate institutions.
The interaction yet separation of the two maintained an appropriate
balance. Citizens should not absolutize the state. The church keeps
the state from becoming an absolutist, totalitarian institution. Nor
should citizens sacralize the state. The state is not supposed to be a
religious institution. It has its own ends. This recognition of the
autonomy of the state strengthened Murray's support of the First
Amendment. "The immediate point here is that the American polit-
ical tradition, whose parentage was English rather than Continental,
has remained substantially untouched by the two radical vices which
ruined the medieval heritage on the Continent-absolutism and the
sacralization of politics."' 77 In the United States, separation of church
and state
does not make the state a church, nor does it establish a political
religion. It does not envisage an evacuation of the Christian sub-
stance of society; it simply imposes restrictions on the legal activity
of the state. It has an effect quite opposite to that of Continental
176. See also Murray, Government Repression, supra note 147, at 64.
177. John Courtney Murray, Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 145, 151 (1953) [hereinafter Murray, Leo XIII]. See also John Courtney Murray, Leo
XIII: Two Concepts of Government, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 551, 564 (1953) ("The role of gov-
ernment, and its essential contribution in this field, remain on principle always political, not
religious."). But see MuRRAY, WvE HOLD, supra note 151, at 201 ("My generalization will be that
the political experiment of modernity has essentially consisted in an effort to find and install in
the world a secular substitute for all that the Christian tradition has meant by the pregnant
phrase, the 'freedom of the Church."').
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separation. So far from sacralizing the political community or the
legal order, it secularizes both. That is, it confines law and govern-
ment to secular purposes (which are understood to include the moral
purposes of freedom, justice, peace, and the general welfare). 7 '
The First Amendment protects this proper Christian understand-
ing of the state. The separation of church and state in Europe was not
the separation of church and state of the United States. Roman criti-
cisms of the First Amendment were wrong. The First Amendment
does not implicitly establish "the doctrine that all churches are simply
voluntary societies of equally human origin and of equal value in the
sight of God, each of them offering to man an equally good way to
eternal salvation." '179 The First Amendment is a political, not a theo-
logical or ethical agreement. It does not establish indifferentism.
Catholics support the First Amendment from their comprehen-
sive world view. In Murray's language, the First Amendment is not
"articles of faith"; it does not assert a theological truth. Catholics sup-
port the First Amendment as "articles of peace."'8 ° "He takes the
highest ground available in this matter of the relations between reli-
gion and government when he asserts that his commitment to the reli-
gion clauses of the Constitution is a moral commitment to them as
articles of peace in a pluralist society."' 81 Some modern interpreters
of Murray interpret this distinction between faith and peace to mean
that Catholics tolerate the First Amendment, that it is a lesser good. 82
Murray rejected that view when he dismissed the thesis/hypothesis
distinction. Articles of peace have "high moral value"183 ("very great
virtue"?). 184 A political agreement in a pluralistic society is a good
178. Murray, Leo XIII, supra note 177, at 153 (emphasis added). See also MURRAY, WE
HOLD, supra note 151, at 66 ("Christianity has always regarded the state as a limited order of
action for limited purposes, to be chosen and pursued under the direction and correction of the
organized moral conscience of society, whose judgments are formed and mobilized by the
Church, an independent and autonomous community, qualified to be the interpreter of man's
nature and destiny.").
179. John Courtney Murray, Separation of Church and State, 76 AMERICA 261, 261 (1946).
180. MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 49.
181. Id. at 78. But see Gerard V. Bradley, Beyond Murray's Articles of Peace and Faith, in
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CML CONVERSATION 200 (R.P. Hunt &. K.L.
Grasso eds., 1992) (noting "how precarious Murray's distinction is" between articles of faith and
peace).
182. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 181, at 194 (noting confusion of faith and peace language.
"But it remains the case that Murray's work suggests that our institutions are Christian, and that
is incompatible with what he characterizes as 'articles of peace."').
183. MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 60.
184. But see Bradley, supra note 181, at 200:
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thing. A political realm not governed by theological principle is a
good thing. "Two there are," church and state.'
D. THE SECULAR PURPOSE OF THE LAW
Murray was confident in leaving secular affairs to the state
because he believed that other institutions of society would pursue
additional human goals and purposes. 8 6  "Properly 'society'
designates a structured order of human relationships (familial, civic,
economic, religious, etc.) which is constituted in view of an end."' 8 7
While "two there are," church and state, Murray also emphasized the
importance of intermediate social institutions. Murray distinguished
among "civil society," "political society," "state" and "govern-
ment."''8  Civil society's "scope is as broad as civilization itself,"'8 9
including the full range of human associations and groups. It
"designates the total complex of organized human relationships on the
temporal plane, which arise either by necessity of nature or by free
choice of vill, in view of the cooperative achievement of partial
human goods by particular associations or institutions."' 190 "Society is
composed of a rich and overlapping set of human communities such as
families, neighborhoods, churches, labor unions, corporations, profes-
sional associations, credit unions, cooperatives, universities, and a host
of other associations."' 91 "Society" in Murray's thought is similar to
the "nonpublic" institutions recognized by John Rawls. Murray's defi-
nition of society should explain why some critics of Rawls dispute his
characterization of these groups as "nonpublic."
The burden of his "two articles" analysis is to argue for Catholic acceptance of the
clauses. In other words, Catholics need not derive their political allegiance from "inter-
nal" Catholic criteria. This much establishes that Murray is no liberal in the theoretical
sense represented by John Rawls ... The hallmark of such liberalism is construction of
political institutions and principles of justice to govern them completely independent of
religious belief. Rawls's method is to prescind from virtually all moral and religious
commitments in the "original position" of choice. Murray sees that this stance is
neither religiously neutral nor "areligious"; he recognizes that it implicitly involves the
privatization of religion.
185. MURRAY, vE HOLD, supra note 151, at 197-217.
186. See Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political, supra note 63, at 883-84 ("In the 1950's, Jac-
ques Maritain and John Courtney Murray argued for the compatibility of a public role for reli-
gion with the institutions of democracy by reaffirming the distinction between society and the
state.... [T]he society-state distinction is at the root of their affirmation both of religious free-
dom and of constitutional democracy. It is the basis for their firm opposition to all forms of
totalitarianism, state absolutism, or religious coercion.").
187. Murray, State Religion, supra note 164, at 175.
188. Id. at 158 n.6.
189. Id. See generally CURRAN, supra note 170, at 197.
190. Id.
191. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political, supra note 63, at 883-84.
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Political society "designates civil society as politically organized,
i.e., organized for the common good."'192 The state is "that particular
subsidiary functional organization of the body politic, whose special
function regards the good of the whole."1 93 Government is "the ruler-
in-relation-to-the-ruled; it is likewise the ruled-in-relation-to-the-
ruler."'194 The state and government are to serve civil society. "The
writ of government does not reach as far as the full scope of the public
life of society.' '1 95
Murray's insights into politics also applied to the law. Of one
legal conclusion Murray was clear. "The First Amendment surely
passes the test of good law."' 196 Both law and politics serve secular
purposes. As he distinguished between the church and the state, so
Murray distinguished between divine and moral law and human law.
"The area of state-that is, legal-concern was limited to the pursuit
of certain enumerated secular purposes (to say that the purposes are
secular is not to deny that many of them are also moral.)"' 97 The state
enforces civil law; it is not required to enforce the whole moral law.
In an unpublished article of 1955 (unpublished because of Rome's
edict), Murray distinguished between Catholicism's divine law and
human law. There is a "distinction between Church and state,
between the order of ethics and theology and the order of law and
politics, between the dogmatic judgments of the Church and the legal
decisions of government."'19 "The jurist's work proceeds from the
axiom that the principles of religion or morality cannot be trans-
gressed, but neither can they be immediately translated into civilized
human law."' 199 The government, e.g., cannot compel acts of
worship.2o
192. Murray, State Religion, supra note 164, at 158 n.6.
193. Id.
194. Ld.
195. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political, supra note 63, at 884. See also John Courtney
Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTy, supra note 156, at 144-45
(identifying distinctions between sacred and secular, society and state, common good and public
order. "In general, 'society' signifies an area of freedom, personal and corporate, whereas 'state'
signifies the area in which the public powers may legitimately apply their coercive powers. To
deny the distinction is to espouse the notion of government as totalitarian.").
196. MuRRAY, WE HoLD, supra note 151, at 72.
197. Id. at 66.
198. Murray, Leo XIII and Pius XII, supra note 156, at 90.
199. Id. at 60; see also id. at 58: (recognizing "the distinction between the order of divine
law, natural and revealed, and the order of human law; between ethical and theological principle
and legal rules; or, if you will, between principles and their application.").
200. Id. at 57 ("One might further say that, in proportion as a society approaches the Chris-
tian ideal, law becomes less and less important.").
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This is another reason why Catholics may participate in the over-
lapping consensus. They do not expect their comprehensive doctrine
to become the law of the United States, even when their comprehen-
sive doctrine is true.
It is sufficient to say that the distinction between moral and theolog-
ical questions and questions of human law derives from the fact that
the former raise only one issue-the issue of truth and right,
whether natural or revealed; whereas the latter raise two distinct
issues. Legal questions do indeed raise an issue of truth and right,
the quaestio iuris, the relation of the proposed enactment to the
order of moral and theological principle. But they also raise an
issue of prudence, the quaestio facti, the relation of the proposed
enactment to the common temporal good of the society for which it
is proposed. Legal questions therefore depend for their right solu-
tion, not only upon general principles of the moral or theological
order, but also upon an intermediate set of norms, the norms of
jurisprudence and political wisdom.301
Murray relied upon this prudential aspect of the law to argue that the
church should not oppose the decriminalization of contraception in
the law of Massachusetts.' 2 In his article on the law of contraception
(written before Humanae Vitae), Murray did not question the church's
teaching to Catholics.0 3 Catholics should affirm the ban on contra-
ception as a matter of private morality, but should not enforce this ban
as a matter of law. It sounds as if Catholics should approach contra-
ceptive legislation as Rawlsians. They accept the truth of the pope's
teaching; they practice that teaching in their private lives; they vote
against a ban because they cannot defend their position by a principle
held in common with their fellow citizens. In this case, religious and
moral pluralism mean that Catholics may not ask the state to criminal-
ize artificial contraception.
The more decisive reason [against the legal ban] is that the practice
... has received official sanction by many religious groups within
the community. It is difficult to see how the state can forbid, as
201. Id. at 59.
202. John Courtney Murray, Memo to Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation, in
BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR, supra note 124, at 81-86 [hereinafter Murray, Memo
to Cardinal Cushing].
203. But see John Courtney Murray, Appendix: Toledo Talk, in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND
THE SECULAR, supra note 124, at 336 (On birth control, "[t]he church reached for too much
certainty too soon, it went too far. Certainty was reached in the absence of any adequate under-
standing of marriage. This, many would hold--I would hold--is today no longer theologically
tenable.... It is also psychologically untenable.").
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
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contrary to public morality, a practice that numerous religious lead-
ers approve as morally right. The stand taken by these religious
groups may be lamentable from the Catholic moral point of view.
But it is decisive from the point of view of law and jurisprudence,
for which the norm of "generally accepted standards" is
controlling.2°
Public reason applies. When Catholics discuss contraception law pub-
licly, they "must make publicly known the grounds of their approval,
namely, that they, like all citizens, are bound on the principles of law,
jurisprudence, and religious freedom."2 ' 5
Catholics of course will continue to teach other Catholics not to
use artificial contraception. They will continue to proclaim that con-
traception is morally wrong, but
out of their understanding of the distinction between morality and
law and between public and private morality, and out of their
understanding of religious freedom, Catholics repudiate in principle
a resort to the coercive instrument of law to enforce upon the whole
community moral standards that the community itself does not com-
monly accept.2°6
Enforcing a comprehensive doctrine on one's fellow citizens would be
coercion, prohibited by both Rawls and Murray. Since Roe v. Wade,
decided six years after Murray's death, Catholic scholars have debated
whether this prudential account of the law applies to the issue of
abortion.20 7
204. Murray, Memo to Cardinal Cushing, supra note 202, at 83.
205. Id. at 84.
206. Id. at 85-85 (emphasis added).
207. See generally Charles E. Curran, Civil Law and Christian Morality: Abortion and the
Churches, in ABORTION: THE MORAL IssUEs 143, 143-165 (E. Batchelor ed., 1982); RICHARD P.
McBRIEN, CAESAR'S COIN: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 126-29, 164-68 (1987); Mary
C. Segers, Murray, American Pluralism, and the Abortion Controversy, in JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONVERSATION, supra note 181, at 228-248; Todd David
Whitmore, What Would John Courtney Murray Say? On Abortion and Euthanasia, COMMON.
WEAL, Oct. 7, 1994, at 16. Segers and Whitmore disagree about whether abortion is a matter of
private or public morality and so disagree about the application of Murray's contraception stan-
dard. An additional reason to adopt a Rawlsian position on abortion (i.e., allowing it in the first
trimester) is that in the past, the Catholic tradition did not hold that abortion was killing from
the moment of conception, but at a later date, "more precisely between the sixth week and the
third month of pregnancy." Joseph F. Donceel, Abortion: Mediate vs. Immediate Animation, in
ABORTION: THE MORAL IssUEs, supra, at 110, 111. I argue elsewhere that in Evangelium Vitae
John Paul II has moved away from natural law arguments about abortion to specifically Catholic
reasons to oppose abortion. See infra text accompanying notes 260-67. If the Catholic argu-
ment against abortion is no longer primarily a natural law argument, then Catholics have good
reason not to impose their comprehensive religious doctrine on abortion as the law of the United
States. But see MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY
HeinOnline  -- 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 346 1996-1997
RAWLSIAN LIBERALS
E. WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
Murray's confidence in the autonomy of politics and law, and in
the U.S. system of government, rested in his confidence in the natural
law. His natural law assumptions are spelled out in We Hold These
Truths. Murray's best-known work, this volume collects revised ver-
sions of essays published in the '50s; it was "deliberately" released as a
book in the spring of 1960, before the Kennedy/Nixon election. 208
Murray examined (and accepted) pluralism in the United States, and
urged an American "consensus" on the natural law. He referred to
this book as a "primer of pluralism"; "[t]he term 'primer' is used...
not to indicate that the book is projected for the unsophisticated, but
merely to indicate that there is, despite decades of experience and dis-
cussion so much learned ignorance on the subject. 2 9
By pluralism here I mean the coexistence within the one political
community of groups who hold divergent and incompatible views
with regard to religious questions-those ultimate questions that
concern the nature and destiny of man within a universe that stands
under the reign of God. Pluralism therefore implies disagreement
and dissension within the community. But it also implies a commu-
nity within which there must be agreement and consensus.210
No wonder Rawls suggests that Political Liberalism and this work
are "closely related."2 1 ' The task, of course, still incomplete, is to find
"common principles" that do not "hinder the maintenance by each
group of its own different identity.12 12 Murray did not think the task
would be easy. Amidst religious pluralism, civil discourse is difficult;
when the conversation turns to "metaphysics, ethics, theology" the
participants reach "confusion" because their "universes are incom-
mensurable. 2 13 "We have no common universe of discourse. 21 4
IN AMERICAN POLITCS 16 (1991) ("[R]eligious argument in support of coercive legislation often
can and does satisfy the public accessibility standard.").
208. PELOarE, supra note 154, at 76.
209. See id. at 75 on Murray's typed notes on the book.
210. MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at x (emphasis added).
211. Rawls, supra note 66, at 13.
212. MURRAY, WE HoLD, supra note 151, at x. See id. at 45 ("the public consensus, on
which civil unity is ultimately based, must permit to the different communities the full integrity
of their own religious convictions."); but see Kenneth L. Grasso, We Held These Truths: The
Transformation of American Pluralism and the Future of American Democracy, in JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AmRICAN CIVIL CONVERSATION, supra note 181, at 89-108 (The
solution to the loss of our society's public philosophy is "moral absolutes" with "objective foun-
dation in reality.").
213. MURRAY, WNE HoLD, supra note 151, at 15.
214. I. at 16.
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Moreover, the history and experience of these different religious
groups are so varied that the "differences among us appear to be
almost unbridgeable."21 5
Murray, like Rawls, recognized the difficulty of bridging these
differences, yet argued that the search for consensus must be under-
taken. Citizens must live together in the midst of this pluralism and
they do so by employing the language of reason. The "distinctive
bond of the civil multitude is reason, or more exactly, that exercise of
reason which is argument. '2 16 The language of reason is the natural
law. 17 The natural law provides the language of consensus, the con-
stitutional consensus218 by which citizens of the United States live
together (the "conspiracy"). 19 The constitutional consensus is "an
ensemble of substantive truths, a structure of basic knowledge, an
order of elementary affirmations that reflect realities inherent in the
order of existence."2 0 Consensus is not the same as the majority
opinion; a minority could have the public consensus. "The validity of
the consensus is radically independent of its possible status as either
majority or minority opinion."'"
Both Murray and Rawls, then, are committed to seeking common
ground in politics and law in reason. Natural law and public reason
serve similar functions in their writings. I am not suggesting that the
writings of Rawls and Murray completely agree on the content of nat-
ural law/public reason. Were they to meet to discuss the consensus,
Murray's Catholic and Rawls's Kantian presuppositions about the rea-
sonable would probably come into conflict on some points. On the
occasion that they did meet, at a 1963 conference on law and philoso-
phy, the disagreements were more evident than the agreements. 2 2
215. Id. at 17.
216. Id. at 7.
217. See generally id. at 109-120.
218. See generally id. at 107-109 ("The public consensus appears as the systematization of
experience.... The consensus is not simply 'the facts.' It is a set of principles or standards in
terms of which to pass judgment on the facts.... In a word, the very conception, 'public consen-
sus,' is a moral conception. Morality and the consensus have at least this in common, that they
are not simply reflections of fact, as if whatever is must be considered right.... The consensus
itself is simply the tradition of reason as emergent in developing form in the special circum-
stances of American political-economic life.").
219. Id. at 30, 39.
220. Id. at 9.
221. Id. at 98.
222. See John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
3, 3-18 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964); John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Mr. Rawls's Problem,
in LAW AND PHI.OSOPHY, supra, at 29, 29-34 [hereinafter Murray, The Problem].
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Rawls's paper focused on the question of the "anomalous" situation
of one who "finds himself morally obligated to obey an unjust law."2'
Murray challenged Rawls's "problematic," "the problem of Mr.
Rawls's problem." He argued that Rawls's approach "remove[d]
from human law all manner of transcendental reference, and indeed
any note of heteronomy, in the name of a morality of perfect personal
autonomy."'224 In contrast Murray identified himself with the "older
tradition" whose "problematic" is "how shall it be brought about, in
theory and in practice, that in society a man should, in the end, obey
only God?"2' Perhaps they differed because Rawls was talking about
politics and Murray about civil society 26 In 1997, one imagines that
they would have a civil conversation in which they would work out
their differences. We know at least that Rawls agrees with the Murray
of We Hold These Truths.
As we have seen in the contraception example, Murray conceded
that in a pluralistic society, a minority must not impose its comprehen-
sive views as law. This was quite a concession for Murray, who knew
that in the United States all religious groups are minority groups. Per-
haps it was his long struggle against the "error has no rights" school
that led him to caution against the imposition of philosophical and
religious commitments upon others. We Hold These Truths summa-
rizes Murray's Rawlsian conclusions about coercion and consensus in
an essay on the law of censorship:
First, within the larger pluralist society each minority group has
the right to censor for its own members....
223. Rawls, Legal Obligation, supra note 222, at 5.
224. Murray, The Problem, supra note 222, at 32.
225. Id.
226. The two authors agree about Abraham Lincoln. According to Rawls, Lincoln's Procla-
mation of a National Fast Day in August of 1861 and his two Proclamations of Thanksgiving in
October of 1863 and 1864, as well as the Second Inaugural "with its prophetic (Old Testament)
interpretation of the Civil War as God's punishment for the sin of slavery" are not violations of
public reason for Lincoln's day (although they may be for our own). POLmCAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 1, at 254. Murray praises Lincoln's proclamation of May 30, 1863 as the "authentic
voice of America," MURRAY, WVE HoLD, supra note 151, at 30, which reminds us that "the first
article of the American political faith is that the political community... looks to the sovereignty
of God as to the first principle of its organization." Id. at 28.
The 1863 Proclamation states: "Whereas the Senate of the United States, devoutly recog-
nizing the supreme authority and just government of Almighty God in all the affairs of men and
nations, has by a resolution requested the President to designate and set apart a day for national
prayer and humiliation; And whereas it is the duty of nations as well as of men to own their
dependence upon the overruling power of God, to confess their sins and trespasses in humble
sorrow, yet with the assured hope that genuine repentance will lead to mercy and pardon... "
ld. at 29.
[Vol. 5:297 1997]
HeinOnline  -- 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 349 1996-1997
350 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERDISCIPLINARY LAW JOURNAL
Second, in a pluralist society no minority group has the right to
demand that government should impose a general censorship,
affecting all the citizenry... with a view to punishing the communi-
cation of materials that are judged to be harmful according to the
special standards held within one group.
Third, any minority group has the right to work toward the ele-
vation of standards of public morality in the pluralist society,
through the use of the methods of persuasion and pacific argument.
Fourth, in a pluralist society no minority group has the right to
impose its own religious or moral views on other groups, through
the use of the methods of force, coercion, or violence.22 7
Murray could argue these points because he believed in the truth
of the consensus? "There are truths and we hold them." 9 Rawls
appears to be more agnostic than Murray about the truth. Murray did
fear at times that the consensus was eroding, yet still urged its
renewal.230 Murray retained his confidence in reason, although he
knew that not everyone shared his confidence:
Someone is sure to rise with this question: Sir, you refer to "these
truths" as the product of reason; the question is, whose reason? I
reply that it is not a question of whose reason but of right reason.
But, says the questioner, whose reason is right? And with that
question the whole footing is cut from under any discussion of the
public philosophy. For the implication is that there can be no phi-
losophy which is public. Philosophy, like religion, is a purely private
affair. Indeed, there is no philosophy; there are only philosophies,
or better, philosophers. And for all anyone knows or could possibly
tell, any of them may be right, or none of them.231
The same skepticism of this hypothetical questioner greets Rawls's
account of public reason, as critics charge Rawls with imposing his
own account of reason on others. Rawls has been accused of asking
individuals to privatize their religious beliefs, their comprehensive
doctrines, in the use of public reason. This privatization occurs when
227. MuRRAY, WE HoLD, supra note 151, at 168.
228. Id. at 11, 95.
229. Id. at 95.
230. PELoITE, supra note 154, at 57; see also CuRRaN, supra note 170, at 219 ("Unfortu-
nately, today, when it is most needed, the consensus no longer exists. The only solution is to
rebuild the consensus on the basis of natural law. Not only can Catholics accept the principle of
the founding fathers of our nation, but today the Catholics are the only ones with the abilitt to
rebuild and to rearticulate the consensus.").
231. MuRRAY, W HoLD, supra note 151, at 82, 83.
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they employ the language of public reason and so "bracket" their reli-
gious commitments. Murray would not agree with those critics. He
instead was committed to the proposition that philosophy and theol-
ogy are not private, precisely because they can be translated into pub-
lic reason. The refusal to meet the challenge of public reason is what
"privatizes" religion.
Murray knew that his theory was in some sense discriminatory
among religions, at least among Christians. He commented on the
Protestant discomfort with the natural law style of reasoning, which is
the intellectual heritage of the Catholic." 2 The "Catholic joins the
conversation with complete ease. It is his language." 3 For Murray
this language of reason was also a safeguard. It avoided the danger
that dominant Protestant views would be read into the law or the
Constitution of the United States. It is difficult now to capture the
intensity of the anti-Catholicism against which Murray struggled and
the ferocity with which he fought against Protestant views of church
and state. Murray had to explain to Rome that the First Amendment,
as well as the natural law, protected American Catholics from the
establishment of Protestant churches and perspectives. His natural
law theory is now accused of being inadequate to public discourse
because it is too Catholic in its presuppositions.3 4 It is also accused of
being too secular, of lacking the spiritual force of explicitly religious
language and symbolism. Murray thought that he had in the natural
law a language that was properly secular. In one sense, when they
used that language, Catholics abandoned any hope that their compre-
hensive views would become the law of the United States. But there
was never any chance that Catholics would rule the United States,
Protestant rhetoric notwithstanding. More important was that the
language of reason and the First Amendment protected minority
Catholics against the imposition of majority Protestant theological
world views. For American Catholics, the natural law language gave
as much as it took away.
Murray, like Rawls, does not address those whose comprehensive
doctrines are completely incompatible with public reason (although
he was unsympathetic to them). It was clear to Murray that Catholic
232. Id. at 17.
233. Id at 41.
234. See John A. Coleman, A Possible Role for Biblical Religion in Public Life, 40 THEO-
LOGICAL STuD. 700, 705 (1979) ("A second weakness in Murray's strategy for public discourse is
his failure to admit that his own theory of natural law rests on particularistic Catholic theological
principles and theories which do not command widespread allegiance.").
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Americans could accept a political conception of justice, join the over-
lapping consensus and use the language of public reason.
Catholic participation in the American consensus has been full and
free, unreserved and unembarrassed, because the contents of this
consensus-the ethical and political principles drawn from the tra-
dition of natural law-approve themselves to the Catholic intelli-
gence and conscience.3 5
Following Murray, good Catholics should be willing participants in
Rawls's consensus. Yet thirty-seven years later, many of them ques-
tion whether such a consensus endures, or should endure.
Im. THE RETREAT FROM MURRAY
John Courtney Murray died in 1967, before Pope Paul VI issued
his encyclical letter, Humanae Vitae, prohibiting artificial contracep-
tion, in 1968, and before the Supreme Court's abortion decision in
Roe v. Wade. He did not live to join the ecclesial debate about contra-
ception that consumed Catholics after the pope's ban. He had argued
in 1965 that Catholics should not oppose the decriminalization of con-
traception in Massachusetts. 6 He never wrote about abortion law.
This author who had written so extensively about religious pluralism
did not survive to address significant questions of moral pluralism:
pluralism among Catholics about the morality of contraception and
pluralism among citizens of the United States about the morality of
abortion. 7
Many Catholics have wished that Murray had survived to address
these complex questions. Murray now enjoys a renaissance among
Catholic scholars who have used his work to address many of the
social issues that currently confront the United States. Some authors
have speculated about what Murray himself would have said about
235. MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 41.
236. Murray, Memo to Cardinal Cushing, supra note 202, at 81-86.
237. See Bradley, supra note 181, at 193 (" Nowhere does Murray welcome 'moral plural-
ism,' nor did he think American institutions could survive it."); Grasso, supra note 212, at 100
("The loss of the public philosophy entailed a fundamental change in the nature of our pluralism.
Specifically, it resulted in a transition from a religious to a moral pluralism, a transition from a
community consisting of a plurality of churches and faiths divided by religious questions but
united in their adherence to a common set of substantive moral principles to a community united
only by geographical proximity and the acceptance of a common set of political and legal proce-
dures."); Robert P. Hunt, Moral Orthodoxy and the Procedural Republic, in JOHN COURTNEY
MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONVERSATION, supra note 181, at 252, 268 (refusing "to
portray Murray as an indifferentist who would be willing to sacrifice moral principle at the altar
of expediency or a truncated view of civil peace." "Murray was not a defender of moral
neutrality.").
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these issues; others have used Murray's work as a framework for
resolving these issues. As one might expect, interpretations of Mur-
ray's legacy and relevance for current issues vary.23 8
We will never know, of course, what Murray would say now. My
own intuition is that Murray would agree with Rawls. More impor-
tant is that the critical response to Murray on the part of many
authors-what I label the "retreat from Murray"-illuminates con-
temporary criticisms of Rawls's account of religion, law, and politics.
A. MuRRAY's UNF IN SmD AGENDA
A 1976 "Symposium on John Courtney Murray's Unfinished
Agenda" expresses some of the criticisms that characterize the
"retreat from Murray." The participants of course do not describe
themselves as in retreat from Murray. It is fair to describe them as
men sympathetic to Murray's agenda. The symposium focuses on
whether Murray's natural law approach "underestimates the potential
contribution which explicitly Christian theological discourse can make
to a comprehensive understanding of justice and human rights."239
Here we see the question that now preoccupies the public debate:
How much religious language should we include in public discourse?
Only Bryan Hehir, then of the United States Catholic Confer-
ence, defended "the perennial need for philosophical discourse," not
public theology. He concluded that "the complexity of the major
social issues we face, combined with the need to enlist allies who must
be persuaded of both the justice and feasibility of specific proposals,
requires the sophisticated structure of the kind of philosophically rig-
orous social ethic which the Catholic tradition has produced in the
past,"240 namely, the approach of Murray's natural law. Hehir
employed this method in the 1980s when he participated in the writing
of the United States bishops' pastoral letters on war and the economy.
The other participants were more critical of the natural law. Jes-
uit John Coleman noted "the relative lack ... of appeals to biblical
238. See generally George Weigel, The Future of the John Courtney Murray Project, in JOHN
COURTNEY MURRAY AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL CONVERSATION, supra note 181, at 273-96
(describing interest in Murray after Murray's death).
239. David Hollenbach, Theology and Philosophy in Public: A Symposium on John
Courtney Murray's Unfinished Agenda, 40 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 700, 701 (1979).
240. Bryan Hehir, The Perennial Need for Philosophical Discourse, 40 THEOLOGICAL STUD.
700, 712 (1979).
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imagery" in Murray's corpus, arguing that "this lacuna skews Mur-
ray's writings on public issues too strongly in the direction of liberal
individualism, despite his own intentions."24' Coleman offers numer-
ous criticisms of a natural law discourse without biblical imagery. For
example, "secular" language is "chaste, sober, and thin," "unable to
evoke the rich, polyvalent power of religious symbolism, a power
which can command commitments of emotional depth."24 Biblical
imagery can thus motivate and inspire in a way that public reason
cannot.
Jesuit David Hollenbach recognized the complexity of this ques-
tion about universalistic and particularistic language, and identified
the advantages and disadvantages of each. Murray's approach
"presumes that an American public philosophy is in our possession,
that the concepts and norms of such a mode of discourse are stable
and well articulated, and that they are adequately correlated with the
Christian vision."'243 Such a presumption, of course, is questionable.
Hollenbach had noted in an earlier, more lengthy, article that Murray
himself questioned whether such a philosophy exists.
In Murray's opinion, such a public philosophy had ceased to exist in
the United States when he was discussing the question in the 1950s.
In the face of this reluctant conclusion, his strategy became that of
arguing that such a publicly shared set of moral beliefs ought to
241. Coleman, supra note 234, at 702 (emphasis added); see also CURRAN, supra note 170, at
224 ("There can be no doubt that Murray does not give enough significance to the role of the
gospel and of the mystery of Christ in the political and social orders of human existence. The
gospel, grace, and Christ must have something to say about all worldly realities."); David Hol-
lenbach, Public Theology in America: Some Questions for Catholicism After John Courtney
Murray, 37 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 290,301 (1976) (citing JAMES GUSTAFSON, CHRISTIAN ETHICS
AND THE COMMUNITY 53 (1971)) ("[O]ne never finds a serious example of biblical exegesis in
the entire Murray corpus on Church-state relations.").
242. Coleman, supra note 234, at 706. See also JOHN A. COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATE-
GIC THEOLOGY 193 (1982) ("It is my reading of the American record, however, that the strong-
est American voices for a compassionate just community always appealed in public to religious
imagery and sentiments, from Winthrop and Sam Adams, Melville and the Lincoln of the second
inaugural address, to Walter Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr and Frederick Douglass and
Martin Luther King."). But see ROBERT W. MCELROY, THE SEARCH FOR AN AMERICAN Pun.
LIC THEOLOGY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY 154 (1989) (While agreeing
with Coleman that scripture is important, "the acknowledgment of the need for biblical symbol-
ism and religious imagery does not lead to the conclusion that a contemporary American public
theology should be a biblically-founded theology ... [T]he core of that public theology [should
be] a natural law base.").
243. Hollenbach, supra note 239, at 714.
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exist, even though it did not; for without such a public philosophy
no nation could long survive. 244
Hollenbach disagrees with that choice. Murray feared that public
philosophy was in danger, and identified faith as an important element
to undergird that philosophy.245 Yet in the absence of public philoso-
phy, Murray urged its return, "the eternal return of natural law."246
In contrast, for Hollenbach, the failure of public philosophy requires a
move to public theology.
[T]he presupposition that there exists a public philosophy and a
public language for moral discourse common to all Americans
which Christians can adopt as their own in public debate is no
longer acceptable. In particular, American Catholics need to move
beyond an approach to public questions based on Murray's version
of the public philosophy to the formulation of a public theology,
which attempts to illuminate the urgent moral questions of our time
through explicit use of the great symbols and doctrines of the Chris-
tian faith.247
244. Hollenbach, supra note 241, at 296. Hollenbach describes this as "a major admission,"
"an implicit acknowledgment that the appeal to reason in the sphere of social morality was not
in fact carrying the weight which Murray hoped it would carry in building bridges between the
diverse groups which make up a pluralistic America." Id. at 297.
245. Id. at 297. Murray opposed a secular culture. See John Courtney Murray, The Con-
struction of a Christian Culture, in BRIDOING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR, supra note 124,
at 103 (American culture "has given citizens everything to live for and nothing to die for. And
its achievement may be summed up thus: it has gained a continent and lost its own soul."); id. at
108 ("Beside those ringing [Christian] words, how cheap and vacuous sound the voice of the
modem liberal humanitarian."). He warned against "the growth among us of a civil religion,
that would somehow be a substitute secular faith, that would undertake to take the place of the
traditional religious faith that has historically given substance to the civilization that we call
Western." The "candidate" for that civil religion is "democracy conceived as a quasi-religious
faith." John Courtney Murray, The Return to Tribalism, in BRIDGING THE SACRED AND THE
SECULAR, supra note 124, at 149; PELOTrE, supra note 154, at 19-21 (expressing Murray's great
fear of secularism).
246. MuRRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 295.
247. Hollenbach, supra note 241, at 299. "He [Murray] feared that, lacking this theological
grounding and support, the public philosophy would be too unstable to survive." Id. at 297. See
also CURRAN, supra note 170, at 224-25 ("Murray can also be criticized for failing to recognize
the reality of sin and its influence on human existence in the temporal sphere. Again, such a
failure comes from a narrow view of seeing the political, social, cultural, and economic aspects
almost univocally in light of the natural."); Joseph A. Komonchak, Fullness of Faith: The Public
Significance of Theology, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 24, 1993, at 28 (book review) ("The book thus
adds its support to a view of Murray's project that threatens to become a consensus: that Mur-
ray's appeal to natural law philosophy in order to generate the public consensus through which
religious meanings and values could be publicly mediated was a mistake theologically (the
remark was recently made that Murray had thereby 'muzzled' his faith), strategically, and
effectively.").
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Hollenbach appears to express similar criticisms of the public reason
of John Rawls.2'
Hollenbach concedes that Murray was "uneasy" with public the-
ology, for four reasons.249 First, he did not want to impose a theologi-
cal view by means of the power of the state; second, he did not want
the First Amendment to become a theological statement; third, "he
was concerned to protect the proper autonomy of the secular
sphere."250 Hollenbach agrees with these reasons. However, he dis-
putes the fourth reason why Murray preferred public philosophy to
public theology. Hollenbach thinks that "[t]here is a kind of dualism
in Murray's thinking which, despite this stress on the presence of the
sacred in the temporal through graced humanity, sets a great divide
between the religious and the secular."'" The religious and the secu-
lar meet in the individual human person,1 2 but "not in the public
sphere." 3 Murray's theory has "institutional dualism as its primary
principle."'2 54 (Two there are.) Hollenbach acknowledges that dual-
ism is valuable as a foundation for religious liberty, but adds that its
value is limited in a society that does not possess a public philosophy.
Holienbach opposes such dualism and prefers to bring the two realms
together. He concludes: "In a pluralistic society such as contemporary
America, an attempt to develop a social ethic which is rooted in Chris-
tian faith without beginning with the biblical symbols and never leav-
ing them entirely behind is, I think, doomed to failure. '2-5
The only non-Catholic author in the symposium, Robin Lovin,
identifies the difficulty in maintaining the society-state distinction
favored by Murray. "A rigid division of social life between subsidiary
248. David Hollenbach, A Communitarian Reconstruction of Human Rights: Contributions
from Catholic Tradition, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 142, at 134-135 ("If Rawls meant that his newly pragmatic
approach to the justice of political institutions would ensure public space for debate about larger
and more encompassing visions of the good, then the Catholic tradition would have no difficulty
entering the fray. But Rawls denies that debates about our common life in the polls should
grapple with 'comprehensive' visions of the social good.... But for Rawls there is no way to
resolve these disputes.").
249. Hollenbach, supra note 241, at 299.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 300.
252. Id. ("The relation between the sacred and the secular, as Murray understand it,




255. Id. at 301-02. ("[Missing element" in public discussion is "sense of the sacred," and
Murray's language cannot capture that.).
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institutions, which are guided by moral norms, and the state, which is
guided by jurisprudence, does not accurately reflect the functional
interpenetration of society and state nor the unavoidable impact of
state policy on the moral possibilities open to persons in society. ''256
Thus Lovin too is troubled by the strict divisions or strict dualism in
the realm of the state. He, too, prefers "public theology" to "public
philosophy" as the approach more open to explicitly religious lan-
guage, more responsive to the interpenetration of realms in modem
society.
Since 1978 the unfinished agenda for the Catholic Church has
been set by the Polish pope, who has led the retreat from the Ameri-
can Murray's commitment to constitutional democracy. John Paul's
view of politics marks a change from his predecessor Pope Paul VI, 7
whose encyclicals reflect a Thomistic perspective. Twentieth century
papal social thought was profoundly influenced by the renewed study
of Thomas Aquinas, which was recommended by Pope Leo XIII at the
end of the nineteenth century. That renewal, e.g., fostered inductive
instead of deductive theories of social ethics and politics. Modem
interpreters of Thomas argued that his natural law theory was not a
set of abstract principles from which one deduces moral norms, but
was instead inductive and historical."' The latter view is captured in
Paul VI's famous statement that the church cannot always offer uni-
versal solutions to political problems. 59 Paul's humility about the
church's expertise in politics was joined to a positive, optimistic view
of the state's role in promoting justice.
John Paul II is more Augustinian in outlook, more pessimistic
about political life than his predecessors. One of the first steps of his
pontificate was to order priests to leave political office (as in the case
of Robert Drinan, S.J., in the U.S. House of Representatives) or to
refrain from political activism (as in his criticism of the liberation
256. Robin Lovin, Resources For a Public Theology, 40 TmOLOGICAL STUD. 700, 708-09
(1979).
257. John Paul I is technically John Paul II's predecessor, but he did not live to develop a
political philosophy or theology.
258. See supra note 161.
259. See Paul VI, Octogesima Adveniens, in Tim GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE 485, 487
no. 4 (Joseph Gremillion ed., 1976) ("In the face of such widely varying situations it is difficult
for us to utter a unified message and to put forward a solution which has universal validity. Such
is not our ambition, nor is it our mission. It is up to the Christian communities to analyze with
objectivity the situation which is proper to their own country, to shed on it the light of the
Gospel's unalterable words and to draw principles of reflection, norms of judgment and direc-
tives for action from the social teaching of the Church.").
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theologians in Latin America). John Paul prefers the deductive appli-
cation of Christian principles in politics to the inductive, more histori-
cally situated approach of Paul VI and John Courtney Murray.260 His
skepticism about politics may reflect his life-long opposition to the
Communist state in Poland. However, he has shown little apprecia-
tion for the American culture and democratic institutions that battled
Communism.
John Paul has grown suspicious of the influence of democracy on
morality and moral truth. Late in his pontificate, he has declared war
on moral pluralism ("ethical relativism").261 To the relativism of mod-
em morals he offers Catholicism's absolute moral truth. 62 John Paul
has rejected the possibility of moral pluralism in the church, where he
has silenced dissenters who question his interpretation of the Catholic
moral tradition. He has pushed to extend infallibility to moral, not
dogmatic, teachings to an extent unparalleled in the modern papacy.
Nor does he accept moral pluralism outside the church. His 1995
encyclical Evangelium Vitae opposes modem culture as a culture of
death and calls for a return in all societies to the moral truths taught
by the church. Truth, including moral truth, is the only proper basis
for society. John Paul asserts that democracy is "an empty word '263
without an objective moral order (the moral order taught by the
church). John Paul does not "agree to disagree" about moral
pluralism.
Evangelium has been interpreted as a document aimed specifi-
cally at the church in the United States, where "cafeteria Catholics"
have strayed from the church's moral teaching by picking and choos-
ing the teachings they will follow. Meanwhile, as Poland drafted its
constitution, the church-state issue was controversial.264 "The Catho-
lic Church here 'is very allergic to this separation of church and state,'
said Jerzy Turowicz [in 1995], the influential editor of the independent
Catholic weekly, Tygodnik Powszechny, in Cracow. 2 65 "In the dis-
cussions over the constitution, the church got its way on wording
260. I explain that John Paul has shifted to the deductive method in his encyclical letter
SoLLicrrUDo REI SociALis in Leslie Griffin, Moral Criticism as Moral Teaching, in THE MAK.
ING OF AN ECONOMIC VISION 240 (Oliver F. Williams & John W. Houck eds., 1991).
261. See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995).
262. See also Grasso, supra note 212, at 114 ("Political unity, in short, presupposes, and must
be informed by, an antecedent moral unity.").
263. POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 261, at no. 70.
264. Jane Perlez, Shrinking Gap Betveen Polish Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1995,
at A3.
265. Id.
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describing the relationship between church and state," with the gov-
ernment "agreeing to strike a phrase that would have characterized it
as 'neutral."'2 66 "A compromise formula, which replaced the word
'neutrality' with 'impartiality,' "267 also faced opposition from the bish-
ops. Such disputes suggest the eternal return of the thesis/hypothesis,
the ultimate retreat from Murray.
The spectrum from Robin Lovin to John Paul II is broad indeed,
and authors on that spectrum, including the pope, continue to agree
with much that Murray has written. Yet their differences with Murray
echo the critical reaction to Political Liberalism. We hear that the
consensus in public philosophy or public reason no longer exists.
Some argue that the consensus cannot exist. If the consensus is to be
reconstituted, religious sources are necessary. The language of public
reason or natural law is inadequate to resolve our moral pluralism; we
need further insights from religion. The language of consensus is not
true, and only the truth is an adequate basis for any society. Religious
truth is needed. Public reason does not motivate; its secularity dis-
criminates against believers who are entitled to equal status in the
community. The secular is not neutral, but harmful to religion.
These complaints are clearly important to Catholics arguing
within their comprehensive doctrine. Yet they are not unique to
Catholics. Many of these concerns about a secular culture have been
expressed by Stephen Carter, who in The Culture of Disbelief argues
that American law and politics trivialize religion.268 His solution to
this problem appears to be that we add more theological language to
the public square. He favors an "open view" of public discourse, a
view that Rawls rejects as far too open to meet the criteria of public
reason. The most interesting aspect of Carter's analysis of our culture
is the extent to which law and politics are culpable for what has hap-
pened to religion. The book is about our culture, but our culture is
encapsulated in our legal and political practices. In that he shares the
focus of the Catholic law professor Michael Perry, who situates his
266. lal The church also pushed for the "most restrictive" abortion laws in Europe and
opposed legislation protecting gays.
267. New Constitution: No End in Sight, POLISH NEws BULL., Dec. 5, 1996, available in
Lexis, News Library, Curnws File. See also Presidential official says constitution more important
than Concordat, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 17, 1997, available in Lexis, News
Library, Cumws File ("Marek Siwiec explained on Polish radio that the guarantee of the separa-
tion of the state from the Church was included in the draft constitution, which has a higher status
than an agreement with the Vatican.").
268. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF How AmERcIAN LAW AND POLI-
TIcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
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writing on law and religion in the tradition of Murray and yet has also
joined the retreat from Murray.
B. MICHAEL PERRY
Michael Perry introduces his book, Love and Power. The Role of
Religion and Morality in American Politics, with a reference to Mur-
ray. "Love and Power is, in part, an effort to grapple with what has
aptly been called 'no small political problem.' "269 The quoted words
are Murray's, from a paragraph of We Hold These Truths on the prob-
lem of pluralism. Perry includes Murray's statement that "the prob-
lem is also theoretical; its solution is an exercise in political
intelligence that will lay down, as the basis for the 'working out,' some
sort of doctrine." 270 Perry then states that "[i]n Love and Power I 'lay
down' several principles 'as a [sic] basis for the "working out" '--prin-
ciples to guide religious participation in the politics of a religiously/
morally pluralistic society like our own. '271 Thus Perry explicitly
takes up Murray's project on pluralism in a different era. "The plural-
ism that figures most prominently in my [i.e., Perry's] discussion is the
pluralism to which Murray referred ... : moral, including religious-
moral, pluralism." 272 Perry begins his constructive chapter six, "Ecu-
menical Political Dialogue," with another long We Hold These Truths
quotation, which ends with the sentence "Civility dies with the death
of dialogue."27 3
Thus Perry endorses and continues Murray's work. However, he
is sharply critical of John Rawls, both in Love and Power and in his
earlier book Morality, Politics, and Law.274 These books antedate
Political Liberalism, but they contain some analysis of the essays that
comprise Political Liberalism. Moreover, Perry's writings since Love
and Power suggest that he would disagree with Political Liberalism,
even as he "hopes that John Rawls' new book, Political Liberalism,
will significantly advance the discussion." 275
269. PERRY, supra note 207, at 5 (emphasis added).
270. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151).
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). See also id. at 8 (noting that American pluralism is "congeni-
tal," citing MURRAY, WE HOU, supra note 151, at 27).
273. Id. at 83 (quoting MURRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 6, 14).
274. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALrrY, POLTCS, AND LAW (1988).
275. Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-And Sec-
ond Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DIGO L. Rlv. 703, 727 (1993); see also MICHAEL
J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLrICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECIVES 54-61 (1997)
(finding Rawls's ideal of public reason in Political Liberalism "inadequate").
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Perry argues that the liberal solutions to religious/moral pluralism
have proven inadequate. He criticizes "neutralist" or "impartial" the-
ories of religion and politics (by Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Nagel,
Ronald Dworkin and Kent Greenawalt) that posit a neutral or secular
ground on which citizens of different religions can agree.276 These
theories are "impossibly restrictive" 277 in their account of politics,
especially for believers. "[T]he quest for the Holy Grail of neutral/
impartial political justification is spent and.., it is past time to take a
different, more promising path."278
Perry is a powerful exponent of the "bracketing" charge, and
raises it against A Theory of Justice. A Rawlsian does not reason as
"the particular person she is";279 "it is, rather, for her to play the role
of someone else reasoning towards principles of justice." 0 His criti-
cism of Justice provides a careful statement of the bracketing criticism
that continues to plague Rawls after Political Liberalism.
If it is the case (as I believe it is) that a person-a "self"-is partly
constituted by her moral convictions, then, in choosing principles of
justice, the partisan cannot bracket her membership in her moral
community, her particular moral convictions, for that membership,
those convictions, are constitutive of her very self. To bracket them
would be to bracket-indeed, to annihilate-herself. And doing
that would preclude her-the particular person she is-from engag-
ing in moral discourse with other members of society. Because the
partisan's membership in a particular moral community-her par-
ticipation in a particular moral tradition-is self-constitutive, she
must find a way to engage persons outside her moral, community in
moral discourse that does not require her to do what in any event
she cannot do-bracket that membership. But is there such a
way?281
This bracketing criticism explains why the neutralist theories do not
satisfy Perry. 2
276. PERRY, supra note 207, at 15 ("[A] truly neutral/impartial practice of political justifica-
tion is inappropriate in American society.").
277. Id. at 29. See also id. at 81 (Ackerman and Nagel privatize religion, which "entails
repression of the essentially political nature of religion.").
278. Id. at 28.
279. PERRY, supra note 274, at 61 (emphasis in original).
280. Id. (emphasis in original).
281. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis in original).
282. See also Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 2061, 2065 (1992) (book review) (noting the "'dignitary harm' suffered by religious believ-
ers who, like Perry, feel silenced and forced to become only truncated selves when they enter the
public square").
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An added feature of the bracketing accusation appears in Perry's
analysis of Ackerman. If the non-religious Ackerman and the Catho-
lic Perry are in an argument and strive to be neutral in Ackerman's
sense, "Ackerman might get to rely on much of the relevant part of
his web of beliefs, while I would get to rely only on strands of my web,
strands approved-'shared'-by Ackerman. '28 3 This is an unfair bal-
ance, in no way neutral. Nagel's neutralism is similarly unfair: "I sus-
pect that the proportion of Nagel's moral (including political-moral)
beliefs that are privileged under his approach is much larger than the
proportion of mine that are privileged. ''2 84 This is a "disadvantage" to
Perry. Murray, in contrast, was comfortable with "bracketing."
Catholics did not have to bracket anything when they spoke the lan-
guage of natural law. Nor was it unfair to them to use the "neutral"
language; "neutral" language protected them from the imposition of
Protestantism.
In Love and Power, Perry describes Rawls as "more promising"
than the neutralists but "still not satisfactory. '28 - Rawls is "more
promising" because he is not as restrictive; he does not privilege secu-
lar over religious convictions. However, Rawls is "not satisfactory"
because the overlapping consensus and the political conception of jus-
tice do not exist. Perry doubts that they ever will. 2 6 "Even if a polit-
ical conception of justice supported by an overlapping consensus is
possible in American society, there is at present no such conception in
the United States."'  There may be some consensus on some polit-
ical-legal questions in the United States, but it is "indeterminate" or
too "narrow." One senses Perry's sympathy with Rawls's project, but
he dismisses the possibility that it can work in practice.8 8 Perry
acknowledges "some affinity" with Rawls, but then concludes that the
hope of a political conception of justice is "wistful," and so should be
283. PERRY, supra note 207, at 10.
284. Id. at 14.
285. Id. at 23. See also PERRY, MoRALrry, supra note 274, at ch. 3, for extensive "critique
of the liberal political-philosophical project." In PERRY, supra note 207, at 22, Perry retains his
"neutral" opponents of Morality, Politics, and Law (Ackerman, Nagel and Rawls) although he
thinks his new book is now "congruent" with Greenawalt.
286. PERRY, supra note 207, at 26.
287. Id. at 26-27.
288. Such principles of justice "simply don't exist." PERRY, supra note 274, at 63.
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discarded. 8 9 Perry does not say so, but Murray's call for the "eternal
return of natural law" must appear equally "wistful" to him.
Perry also doubts that political theories without a thick concep-
tion of the good can sustain society. He questions whether, e.g., a
theory of human rights can survive without deeper underpinning.
"[A] practice of political justification from which disputed beliefs
about human good are excluded lacks the normative resources
required for addressing our most fundamental political-moral ques-
tions.""29 In this he shares Murray's concern that there must be some
deeper basis for the natural law consensus-and the concern of Mur-
ray's successors that we need richer language to sustain us. Perry's
proposal addresses just that issue: "[i]n ecumenical politics beliefs
about human good play a basic role in public deliberations about, and
public justifications of, contested political choices."291
Liberal theories, then, are "impossibly restrictive, 292 unfair to
religious believers, unlikely to sustain a society. Inclusive theories
that bring all religious beliefs to politics fare no better. Love and
Power offers Perry's "middle ground" solution between theories that
are too inclusive and too exclusive of religion. He calls this "ecumeni-
cal politics," at times "religious politics." 293
Ecumenical politics is, in part, a religious politics, in this sense: a
politics in which persons with religious convictions about the good
or fitting way for human beings to live their lives rely on those con-
victions, not only in making political choices but in publicly deliber-
ating about and in publicly justifying such choices.294
Note that Perry proposes his theory as a middle ground. It is not
"open" under Rawls's definition. It is not the same as Stephen
Carter's call for more insertion of religious language and perspective
into our political and legal debates. Nor is it as restrictive as public
289. Perry states that he "has an obvious affinity with a Rawlsian strategy of identifying
normative materials, concerning political morality, supported by a wide consensus. I'm not sug-
gesting, however, that the constitutional and religious premises can support a full-blown, system-
atically elaborated 'political conception of justice'-or, if they can, that they can support only one
such conception. (I'm not denying it either.)" PERRY, supra note 207, at 190 n.30.
290. d at 42. See also Levinson, supra note 282, at 2066 ("The second, quite different,
rationale for allowing the public articulation of religious commitment lies in the presumption
that some kind of religious view is a necessary underpinning for important political values or that
it otherwise helps to maintain the liberal political order as a whole.").
291. PERRY, supra note 207, at 43.
292. Id. at 44.
293. Id at 43, 83, 128.
294. Id. at 112.
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reason. "The practice I defend makes room for some (but not all)
kinds of reliance on some (but not all) kinds of disputed convic-
tions."2 95 Perry speaks of finding a "common ground '296 amidst plu-
ralism; it is unlikely that "agreement" or "consensus" will occur, so he
settles for "dialogue," "ecumenical political dialogue." Following
Murray, we should "limit the warfare, and . . enlarge the
dialogue. 2
97
Yet Murray's dialogue was different. Murray recognized the
autonomy of politics and law and employed natural law language in
those spheres. At the same time he emphasized the liberty of the
church and the truth of his religious convictions. Perry's "conditions"
for dialogue are different. Two "attitudes" and two "virtues" are nec-
essary for ecumenical political dialogue. The two attitudes are fallibil-
ism and pluralism.2 98 The two virtues are public intelligibility and
public accessibility.299 Religion may enter politics and law, and indeed
should enter politics and law, but it must be fallible, pluralistic, intelli-
gible, and accessible. 3°
According to Perry, religion should be self-critical; it should learn
and correct itself in its encounter with politics. "Religious people
must be more than prepared to see their religious beliefs challenged in
the course of political argument." 0' 1 The "church needs the world"
because the church confronts its mistakes in its contact with the world.
The church will learn from the world only if the church is fallible and
pluralist. Perry thus advocates a particular type of religious faith.
Infallible religions should not participate in ecumenical political dia-
logue (or at least should learn to participate fallibly). With such a
criterion one doubts that the pope will encourage American Catholics
295. Id at 44.
296. Id. at 45, 47.
297. Id. at 48 (quoting MURRAY, W HOLD, supra note 151, at 23).
298. d at 100.
299. Id. at 105.
300. While Perry rejects many aspects of liberal theory, he still thinks his is a liberal theory:
with respect to ideals of politics, the opposition between a politics that is "liberal" and
one, like ecumenical politics, that is (partly) religious is quite false. Ecumenical politics
is a liberal ideal. Granted, the liberal character of the ideal does not inhere in some
putatively "neutral" or "impartial" practice of political justification. It inheres, rather,
in certain of the values that animate ecumenical politics, in certain of the existential
prerequisites to ecumenical politics I detailed in the preceding chapter. fallibilism, plu-
ralism, public intelligibility, and public accessibility. Above all the liberal character of
ecumenical politics inheres in the fact that ... tolerance is a principal constituent of
ecumenical politics. Although liberalism-as-neutrality is a dead end .. liberalism-as-
tolerance is not.
PERRY, supra note 207, at 137-38.
301. Id at 104.
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to participate in Perry's public arena, especially in this era of "creep-
ing infallibility. '30 2 Indeed, it is unclear if Murray himself could join
the forum; he consistently insisted upon the truth of Catholic belief.
From the days of intercredal cooperation, he held to the truth of Cath-
olic faith and belief. Even when he challenged the church's teaching,
he did so in the language of the development of doctrine or the appli-
cation of principle in new circumstances, not in terms of error.
Perry's virtues of public intelligibility and public accessibility3 3
should sound familiar to Catholics; they reek of natural law criteria.
Public intelligibility and accessibility oppose "sectarian imperial-
ism. ''3°4 By intelligibility, Perry means that one mediates or translates
her religious language into language others can understand. Perry
once again quotes Murray on the importance of civil conversation.0 5
Accessibility (a "more difficult" concept) "is the habit of trying to
defend one's position in a manner neither sectarian nor authorita-
rian. ' 3 6 One is sectarian if she "relies on experiences or premises"
with little authority beyond the religious community. One is authori-
tarian if she "relies on persons or institutions" with little authority
beyond the religious community.30 7 These standards resonate with
public reason, although Perry suggests that his standard differs from
public reason.30 8 At times, Perry defends accessibility on pragmatic
grounds. "The point, rather, is simply that failure to honor a standard
like that of public accessibility dooms argument in the public square,
302. JAMES M. GUSTAFSON, PROTESTANT AND RoMAN CATHOLIC ETHics 133 (1978) (citing
Charles Curran) (papal documents were "accepted with more authority than in principle they
have"). "Creeping infallibility" means that the pope has tried to expand the range of what he
may declare infallible, specifically from matters of faith and dogma to questions of morality. For
levels of papal teaching, see generally FRAzcis SULLIVAN, MAGISTERIUM (1988).
303. PERRY, supra note 207, at 105.
304. Id. at 108.
305. "As John Courtney Murray emphasized, 'Argument ceases to be civil ... when its
vocabulary becomes solipsist, premised on the theory that my insight is mine alone and cannot
be shared; when dialogue gives way to a series of monologues.... When things like this happen,
men cannot be locked together in argument. Conversation becomes merely quarrelsome or
querulous. Civility dies with the death of dialogue.' (Murray's point, it will soon be clear,
applies as well to the allied virtue of public accessibility.)" Id. at 106 (quoting MURRAY, WE
HOLD, supra note 151, at 14).
306. Id. at 106.
307. Id.
308. Perry, supra note 275, at 727 (citing Solum, Constructing, supra note 54) ("It is one
thing to construct... an exclusivist ideal of political choice.... It is another thing altogether to
make the case that we should accept such an ideal. It does not seem to me that the case has yet
been made.").
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including religious argument, to play a role that is anything but con-
structive."3"9 Perry thinks this standard is fair because inaccessible
non-religious as well as religious argument is excluded.
Perry's position emerges in his discussion of the Symposium On
Murray's Unfinished Agenda. The strict natural law (public philoso-
phy) language of Hehir is insufficient. Perry "largely endorse[s]"
Coleman's call for more biblical religion in public, although he thinks
Coleman does not go far enough.310 He agrees with Hollenbach that
public argument is "incomplete" without some religious reference,
some enriching language.1
Perry criticizes Hehir's universalistic language for two reasons.
First, that position assumes that the church participates in the public
arena only to persuade or to justify its own position.312 Second, Hehir
is wrong to assume that it is sectarian or divisive for the church to use
religious language in public. 313 This first criticism is ecclesial rather
than political; it reiterates Perry's concern that the church must learn
from the world.314 It is not clear, however, why Catholics do not
become sufficiently self-critical whenever they attempt to translate
their beliefs into public philosophy. Indeed the church learned of its
error on religious freedom precisely when Murray used the natural
law language of human dignity and taught Catholics about the First
Amendment. Hehir is not fallibilist enough for Perry, who wants the
church to learn and not just to persuade. The second criticism reiter-
ates the point that we need thick, religious concepts to sustain society.
Society benefits from explicitly religious language.
The two criticisms of Hehir illuminate Perry's position, but also
help to illustrate its flaws. Perry is committed to the reform of reli-
gion. To some extent Love and Power is an exercise in theology rather
than in political philosophy or law. Perry advocates more religion in
309. PERRY, supra note 207, at 107.
310. Id. at 88.
311. Id. at 105.
312. Id. at 102.
313. This is Perry's interpretation of Hehir's assumptions. See also MCELROY, supra note
242, at 154 ("Murray's fundamental insight was correct: in a pluralistic society it is divisive and
illegitimate to base claims for society and the state upon grounds which cannot be justified with-
out sectarian warrants.").
314. PERRY, supra note 207, at 103 ("Why assume that 'the mind of the Church' or other
community is to be shaped only by internal dialogue: deliberation within the religious commu-
nity, among its members? Why shouldn't the mind of the Church or other community be shaped
by external dialogue as well: deliberation between those who are members of the religious com-
munity and those who are not?").
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the public square, but he does not (in Love and Power) follow Ste-
phen Carter's "open" route of letting all religious voices into the pub-
lie square.315 Instead, he is concerned with the quality of religious
voices. In an odd way, Perry is more restrictive of religion than the
"neutralist" Rawls.316 In stark contrast to Rawls, Perry devotes a sig-
nificant part of his book to the definition and criticism of religion.
Chapter five, "Religion and Morality," defines religion and draws
some normative conclusions about it. At one point Perry concludes
that the major religions "converge" on the moral concept that we
"accept some responsibility for the basic well-being of the Other. '317
Perry distinguishes religious faith from religious beliefs. Religious
beliefs (but not faith) are "changing," so it is appropriate that they be
challenged in the midst of public argument. This supports Perry's con-
clusion that all religions should be fallible and pluralist."'
This attempt to define proper types of religious belief leaves
Perry susceptible to the charge of discrimination against religion.31 9
We have seen that Rawls too faces this criticism. Yet the discrimina-
tion is different in one sense. Rawls's demands on religion are far
more limited than Perry's. Rawls does not ask believers to change
their beliefs or to admit that their beliefs are fallible. He asks that
315. See David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodem
America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IowA L. REv. 1067, 1076-77 (1991) (book review)
("Perry has used his own vision of good religion as the standard for admission to political and
legal debate.").
316. But see id. at 1081 (Religious groups discriminated against by Perry would not do any
better under a Rawlsian account, although some neutrality theories nonetheless remain prefera-
ble to Perry. "[I]t is not surprising that essentially the same groups are disadvantaged under
Perry's ecumenical politics as have been disadvantaged under neo-Kantian forms of liberalism.
Indeed, Perry's discrimination against those who reject autonomy as their primary commitment
actually is more explicit, and hence more brutal, than that of neo-Kantian liberalism. Neo-Kant-
ian liberalism at least claimed to be neutral regarding moral conceptions. For example, although
neutrality theory requires that fundamentalist Christians keep their religious and moral convic-
tions out of politics, at least in theory everyone is similarly disabled."); Hollenbach, Contexts of
the Political, supra note 63, at 899 ("In an ironic way, Perry now wants to admit all religious-
moral convictions to the public square for the same reason that Rawls and others want to
exclude them: because they are controverted.").
317. PERRY, supra note 207, at 81.
318. But see Levinson, supra note 282, at 2074 ("What is unacceptable, and indeed astonish-
ing, is Perry'ss tendentious claim that '[a]uthentic religious faith and the virtue of fallibilism are
intimately connected.' This is simply to award his own favorite religious views the prized label of
'authenticity,' and to suggest that other kinds of views are 'inauthentic' and otherwise thor-
oughly second-rate.").
319. See generally Smolin, supra note 315, at 1077 ("It is perhaps no coincidence that Perry's
criteria exclude those most hated by the dominant secularist academy: in particular, theologi-
cally conservative theists, including various Protestant Christians (evangelicals, fundamentalists,
and pentecostals) and traditionalists (Roman Catholics, Anglicans, and Lutherans).").
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religions participate in politics on the basis of their comprehensive
doctrines. He does not tell them what the comprehensive doctrine
should be or how the comprehensive doctrine should find reasons to
support the political conception of justice. Rawls's theory does
exclude some religions that cannot translate their beliefs into public
reason. But he does not ask believers to challenge all their religious
commitments as a condition for participation in ecumenical political
dialogue. With Murray, he recognizes the importance of letting citi-
zens "agree to disagree" about their theological commitments.
The attempt to define religion contributes another weakness to
Perry's ecumenical political dialogue. Perry follows Coleman and
Hollenbach, contra Murray and Hehir, in an effort to include more
religious language in politics. He chides Hehir for thinking that reli-
gious language is "sectarian" or "divisive."32 His own theory, how-
ever, stumbles over the definition of religion. His "middle ground"
between Carter's open view and Rawlsian public reason is not very
clearly defined; it is difficult to interpret what counts as a religious
argument.321
For example, Perry cites the American Catholic bishops' letters,
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin's speeches, Gandhi's political reform, as
well as the "human" aspects of the Good Samaritan story as illustra-
tive of ecumenical political dialogue. He defends the religious lan-
guage of Martin Luther King, Jr. because it was "truly, fully
human."'  That humanity sounds like public reason or natural law,
like Murray or Hehir or Rawls. However, for Perry there are reli-
gious premises under these human claims, and so the language is reli-
gious. Ecumenical politics rely on "religious premises about the
human. '' 31 It appears that most moral and philosophical arguments
are religious for Perry. Hehir would surely argue that the bishops'
letters contain moral and philosophical arguments, as well as theologi-
cal ones. The theological arguments are addressed to Catholics and
the moral and philosophical arguments to all human persons. For
Perry the bishops' argument is religious because "at its very founda-
tion is a set of related religious convictions: the conviction that life is
ultimately meaningful, a conviction about how it is meaningful, and, in
particular, a conviction about the ultimately meaningful way for
320. PERRY, supra note 207, at 105.
321. See Levinson, supra note 282, at 2068 ("Although Perry calls for the admission of reli-
gious discourse into the secular, 'neutral' public square, his vision of religion is a narrow one.").
322. PERRY, supra note 207, at 113.
323. Id.
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human beings to live their lives. 324 Religion is present whenever
there are arguments about the meaning of life, but the meaning of life
is apparently pluralist and fallible.
In contrast to Murray, who carefully distinguished the theologi-
cal, ethical, and political, in order to protect the different realms of
church, society, and state, Perry has elided all three. Every argument
could have some connection to life's meaning, and every argument
could be religious. Under Perry's theory, almost every discussion
could be a religious one (at least until one makes a claim of truth).
The ambiguity of the definition of religion is evident in Perry's
treatment of legislation. He is not troubled by the legislator's passage
of legislation for religious reasons. Once an argument is publicly
accessible (as it must be for ecumenical political dialogue) it has a
secular purpose. Thus ecumenical politics pass constitutional muster
because the public accessibility test satisfies the secular purpose prong
of Lemon.3' 5 The Establishment Clause does not "proscribe, as a
basis for political deliberation, justification, or choice, moral
beliefs,' 326 even moral beliefs that are religious in character. One sus-
pects that Murray would read this argument as an invitation to major-
ity Protestants to impose a theological agenda.
As he elides religious, moral and political language, so Perry at
times fails sufficiently to distinguish politics and law from public cul-
ture. Rawls segregates political discussion about constitutional essen-
tials. Murray separated law and politics from the church. Perry's
realms all run together. He encourages so much theological discussion
that at times it sounds as if the courts and legislatures should be the
locus of theological debate. David Hollenbach criticized this ambigu-
ity of spheres in a response to Love and Power. Holienbach stated
that he would not want a Catholic judge and a Protestant judge to
engage in ecumenical political dialogue in order to decide their cases,
but that Perry seems to allow or encourage this. 27 Perry clarified his
position, agreeing with Hollenbach that he is not proposing ecumeni-
cal politics as a brand of theology for courts and legislatures.32 8 Yet
324. Id. at 119.
325. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
326. PERRY, supra note 207, at 112-13. But see Levinson, supra note 282, at 2070 ("This
claim [of congruence with Establishment Clause jurisprudence] is highly debatable.... [I]t
nonetheless raises a number of questions in regard to accepted First Amendment doctrine.").
327. Hollenbach, Contexts of the Politica4 supra note 63, at 899-900.
328. Perry, supra note 275, at 726.
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his theory does not provide sufficient grounds to support this correc-
tion. Perry does not provide a clear line between the realms of church
and state, and he does not provide a clear distinction of theological,
ethical, and political argument. While quoting Murray extensively, he
has not heeded Murray's warning that neither state nor church is
served by the sacralization of the political. He has not followed Mur-
ray's route of distinguishing civil society from political society and the
state. Ecumenical political dialogue may more appropriately take
place in schools, universities, and churches, not in the courts of law,
the legislature, and the political discussions of citizens.
Moreover, if (as he suggests in his response to Hollenbach) Perry
is serious that his proposals are for a broader cultural dialogue, then
his norms for ecumenical political dialogue are especially questiona-
ble. In cultural or educational discussions, citizens should be free to
express their religious views "openly." Religion does not have to be
pluralist and fallible, intelligible and accessible, to join in cultural dis-
cussions in the United States. John Rawls does not demand that. By
limiting public reason to questions of basic justice and constitutional
essentials, Rawls allows a freer dialogue about religion in the cultural
(for Rawls "nonpublic") arena than does Perry in Love and Power.
David Smolin has pointed out to Perry the discrimination of his
theory against a number of religious groups. In response to Smolin's
criticism, Perry has acknowledged that Love and Power was unfair to
some religions. Perry has now adopted an inclusive view.32 9 Perry
employs the word "inclusivist," but he is not inclusive (or, I think,
even wide) in Rawls's sense. He requires no public reason proviso.
Under Rawls's terminology, Perry's new approach appears to be an
"open" one. He has rejected the middle ground of ecumenical polit-
ical dialogue for an open view that lets all religious voices in. This
change confirms that ecumenical political dialogue was too restrictive
of cultural religion. Perry now states that there may be strategic rea-
sons for not stating "a religious belief that opponents of the choice, or
at least some of them, reject. '330 "But there is no reason to doubt that,
as a matter of ideal American political morality, she may forsake stra-
tegic considerations and make her appeal on a religious basis."'331
Perry continues to quote Murray,332 but he has retreated even further
329. See id.
330. Id. at 704 (italics in original).
331. Id. at 705.
332. Id. at 706-07 (quoting MuRRAY, WE HOLD, supra note 151, at 27) (noting Murray's
observations of congenital American pluralism).
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from Murray's view. "I now see that we Americans should not accept
any exclusivist ideal, either of public political argument or of political
choice-not even any 'middle ground' ideal.
333
Perry concludes his revised theory with this summary, a summary
that leaves many questions unanswered:
1. The proper role of religious discourse "in public" is a role to be
played much more in public culture than in public argument specifi-
cally about political issues.
2. Some religious claims represent bad theology and should there-
fore be rejected.
3. Our politics and law should aspire to be tolerant of moral and
religious differences rather than "moralistic."
4. Some styles of religious participation in politics-those that fail
the test of civility-represent bad citizenship.334
Perry could have moved from his middle ground to distinguish
political from cultural arguments, with Rawls and Murray. However,
he rejects this as unfair.
It is one thing to reject certain beliefs as theologically unsound, or
epistemologically unsound, or both, and, where it seems fitting to do
so, to be willing to challenge them as such. It is another thing alto-
gether to suggest that such beliefs may not serve as a basis for a
political choice (may not, that is, when no other basis is
available.) 335
Rawls and Murray, of course, do not suggest that religious beliefs may
not "serve as a basis" for politics. But they do reject the appeal to
specifically religious arguments for law and politics. Perry's inclusive
standard apparently applies to politics and law as well as to churches
and universities. Citizens in political debate may use the inclusive
view, for Perry does not find it coercive: "Political choices that cannot
be defended without relying on religious beliefs do not invariably
deny to those who reject (or 'reasonably' reject) the beliefs the respect
due them. '336 He is not worried that religion is divisive: "religious
discourse in the American public square is not necessarily more sec-
tarian than is much secular discourse.1337 Perry promotes this
inclusivist ideal even for judges and legislators, who for Rawls should
be the exemplars of public reason. "[I]t is a mistake, in this context, to
333. Id at 713.
334. Id. at 726-27.
335. Id. at 717.
336. Id. at 714.
337. Id. at 722.
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distinguish between citizens and legislators."33 Two there are not.
Everyone follows this open/inclusive view.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some clear distinctions among Murray, Rawls, and Perry have
emerged. For Murray, religious pluralism forced Christians to find
common moral ground with one another, especially in the political
realm. Christians should not seek common ground on the religious
level; about religion believers will "agree to disagree." Consensus of
all citizens is possible because of the natural law, which all human
persons share. Law and politics should not be sacralized; other social
institutions beyond state and court promote spiritual well-being.
Rawls accepts moral as well as religious pluralism. Murray
acknowledged the possibility of moral pluralism but was more opti-
mistic than Rawls about moral agreement. Rawls urges citizens to
seek common ground at the political level, in the overlapping consen-
sus based on a political conception of justice. This account allows
individuals to believe in the truth of their comprehensive doctrines,
moral and religious. Because of their comprehensive doctrines citi-
zens participate in politics, where they speak the voice of public rea-
son. They "agree to disagree" on the rest.
Perry sees the religious and moral pluralism of our time as a
problem to be solved. His initial solution is religious or ecumenical
politics. His standards are different from those of Murray and Rawls.
Cultural discussions of religion (perhaps even discussions within com-
prehensive doctrines) must be pluralist, fallibilist, intelligible, and
accessible. Religious discourse in politics and law should be the same.
Religions should learn to be fallible; Perry does not protect the con-
flicting truth claims of different religions. The practical effect of
Perry's ecumenical political dialogue may be the same as Rawls's pub-
lic reason and Murray's natural law, although the ambiguity in the
interpretation of religion makes that point hard to discern. But post-
Love and Power ecumenical political dialogue is forsaken for an open
view, with Perry's clear rejection of public reason as well as natural
law.
Catholics have a long tradition of accepting arguments because of
the authority of the one who utters them. If Murray is authoritative
338. Id. at 723 (citing Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberations, 30
SAN Dmo L. Rav. 817, 826-31 (1993)).
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(because his views were vindicated at the Second Vatican Council, or
because of the Murray renaissance among Catholic scholars), then
Perry is the heretic in his abandonment of the natural law and of the
autonomy of the state, and Rawls is the traditional Catholic. Of
course, if the retreat from Murray is the new orthodoxy, then Perry is
magisterial in his full retreat from Murray's arguments.
In a tradition where reason is supposed to be the basis of author-
ity, however, Perry is not right or wrong because he disagrees with
Murray. The best argument will be the most reasonable, and the most
reasonable argument will still allow for faith. For American Catholics
in the '90s, the most reasonable account of religion's role in politics is
Political Liberalism.
In the 1990s, the open view of politics may have great appeal for
Catholics disappointed that their comprehensive doctrine has not
become the law of the United States. However, the history of twenti-
eth century American Catholicism cautions against any easy accept-
ance of the open view. Under the open view, in the 1940s American
Catholics would have argued in public (and voted in private) for
Catholicism to become the established religion of the United States.
Under the same open theory their (majority) Protestant opponents
would have been free to enact a theological agenda into law. Mur-
ray's writings on the problem of pluralism offered Catholics a better
option. Instead of an endless theological battle, he encouraged
Catholics to participate on natural law grounds in an appropriately
autonomous state. Such a state would neither advance nor hinder
religious belief; a secular state protects religious belief (especially
minority Catholics) far better than a religious one.
John Courtney Murray was not a secular writer. He believed that
social institutions, churches, associations, schools, and especially uni-
versities, should examine and debate religious questions. Yet now his
project looks too secular to many, as does Political Liberalism.
Appropriate secularity need not destroy religion. In subjecting reli-
gion to the demands of reason, the allegedly secular Murray and
Rawls may do more to advance religion than those who would give us
a religious law and a religious politics.
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